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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the impact of counterparty-risk in CDS (Credit Default
Swap) pricing. The exponential growth of the Credit Derivatives Market in the
last decade demands an upsurge in the fair valuation of various credit deriva-
tives such as the Credit Default Swap (CDS), the Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tion (CDO). Financial institutions suffered great losses from Credit Derivatives
in the sub-prime mortgage market during the credit crunch period. Counter-
party risk in CDS contracts has been intensively studied with a focus on losses
for protection buyers due to joint defaults of counterparty and reference en-
tity. Using a contagion framework introduced by Jarrow and Yu (2001)[48], we
calculate the swap premium rate based on the change of measure technique,
and further extend both the two-firm and three-firm model (with defaultable
protection buyer) with continuous premium payment. The results show more
explanatory power than the discrete case. We improve the continuous conta-
gion model by relaxing the constant intensity rate assumption and found close
results without loss of generality. Empirically this thesis studies the behaviour
of the historical credit spread of 55 sample corporates/ financial institutions, a
Cox–Ingersoll–Ross model is applied to calibrate spread parameters. A proxy
for counterparty spread is introduced as the difference between the spread over
benchmark rate and spread over swap rate for 5 year maturity CDS. We then
investigate counterparty risk during the crisis and study the shape of term struc-
ture for the counterparty spread, where Rebonato’s framework is deployed to
model the dynamics of the term structure using a regime-switching framework.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age
of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief,
it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the
season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of
despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we
were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way
- in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of
its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for
evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.”
—— “A Tale of Two Cities”, by Charles Dickens (1812 - 1870)
It has indeed been the best and worst of times for the financial market and
world economy in the past decade, especially for the newly developed credit
derivatives market.
The valuation of credit derivatives has for a long time been based on default-
free counterparties, as this allows a risk-free valuation of the payments made
under credit derivatives. Even though financial institutions own subsidiaries,
11
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which could act as counterparties in OTC derivatives, and reach strong ratings
of “AAA”, less than half of the market participants have a rating of “A” or above.
Moreover, no credit derivatives are exchange-traded up to now. Following these
arguments, the consideration of counterparty risk is essential for a correct and
consistent valuation of credit derivatives.
Counterparty credit risk is the risk that the counterparty to a financial con-
tract will default prior to the expiration of the contract and will not be able to
make the full payments required by the contract. Contracts privately negotiated
between counterparties, this includes over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives such
as Credit Default Swaps and Interest Rate Swaps, and security financing trans-
actions (SFT), are subject to counterparty risk. Exchange-traded derivatives
are not affected by counterparty risk, because the exchange guarantees the cash
flows promised by the derivative to the counterparties. Counterparty risk is
theoretically present in derivatives of all asset classes; FX derivatives, IR swaps,
OTC equity derivatives and credit derivatives. In this thesis we focus on credit
derivatives, on Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) to be more specific.
Counterparty risk is similar to other forms of credit risk in that the cause
of economic loss is obligor’s default. However, there are two features that set
counterparty risk apart from more traditional forms of credit risk: the uncer-
tainty of exposure and bilateral nature of credit risk. Canabarro and Duffie
(2003)[8] provide an excellent introduction to this subject. Unless derivative
contracts are collateralised or guaranteed, their ultimate value is dependent on
the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, before a
contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses in their current
earnings statements.
Here we focus on two main issues: modelling the default process and pricing
counterparty risk, more precisely, the effect on premium rate changes due to the
possibility of defaultable counterparties, this involves both the protection seller
and the protection buyer.
The most important aspect of modelling counterparty risk is the treatment
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of correlations between the credit risk of the underlying asset and the credit
risk of the counterparty. If perfect correlation is assumed, one can easily see
the importance of correlation for valuation purposes. For example, if a financial
institution with an AAA-rating is selling CDSs as a protection seller and the
reference entity is its own bond, then the swap with an assumed recovery rate
of zero is worthless. This is due to the fact that in the event of default of the
reference entity, which triggers the credit event under the CDS, the protection
seller, or say, risk buyer, default as well. If, in contrast, the protection seller is
solvent, i.e., no credit event occurs, the protection seller will not be drawn on.
1.1 Credit Derivatives
1.1.1 Credit Default Swaps
Credit Default Swap is the most popular type of credit derivatives, according to
Credit Derivatives Survey by BBA (British Bankers’ Association), it accounts
for 45% of the global credit derivatives market on average, and an even higher
73% according to Credit Derivatives Survey by Risk Magazine. Due to the
crisis in 2007 and 2008, the notional amount outstanding of credit derivatives
has decreased by 12 percent on Mid-Year of 2008 to $54.6 trillion from $62.2
trillion, but the annual growth for credit derivatives was 20 percent from $45.5
trillion at mid-year 20071, this is from the market survey provided by ISDA (the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association).
As mentioned in earlier chapters, a credit default swap is a contract that
protects the holder of an underlying obligation from the losses caused by the
credit event to the obligation’s issuer, referred to as the reference entity. Credit
events that trigger a default swap payment includes: bankruptcy, failure to
make a principle or interest payment, obligation acceleration, obligation default,
repudiation/moratorium (for sovereign borrowers) and structuring; these events
1For the purposes of the Survey, credit derivatives comprise credit default swaps referencing
single names, indices, baskets, and portfolios.
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are referred to as default. A credit default swap, only pays out once the reference
entity defaults. The protection buyer either pays an up-front amount or makes
periodic payments to the protection seller, typically a percentage of the notional
amount, which is called the spread if the percentage gives the contract zero value
at initiation stage.
1.1.2 Recovery Rate
Should default occurs, the default swap can be settled in either:
• a cash settlement - the buyer keeps the underlying asset, but is compen-
sated by the seller for the loss incurred by the credit event;
• a physical settlement - the buyer delivers the reference entity to the seller,
and receives the full notional amount in return.
Either way, the value of the buyer’s portfolio is restored to the initial notional
amount, and the percentage the protection seller is oligated to compesation is
called the Recovery Rate.
Recovery Rate = 1− LossRate (1.1)
1.1.3 Counterparty Risk
CDS contracts have been around since the mid 90s, they have grown explosively
since 2002. Credit default swaps are the most widely traded credit derivatives,
with an estimated $62.2 trillion notional amount outstanding at the end of 2007,
up from $2.1 trillion five years earlier, according to the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association. The growth is shown in Figure 1.1:
A CDS is an agreement between two counterparties, typically for five years,
in which the buyer makes periodic payments to the seller in return for a promised
payoff if a third party defaults. The cost of such protection against default has
risen sharply as a result of the global credit crunch, as well as the growing risk
of corporate defaults in a weakening economy. Banks are the primary sellers of
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Figure 1.1: Notional Amount of Outstanding Credit Derivatives
Notice that the notional amount outstanding is $45 trillion, while the economic
exposures of derivatives are a fraction of the notional amount.
CDS, contributing up to 40% of all written CDS and representing a notional
exposure of $18.2 trillion. As should be evident from the events in subprime
crisis, even the most sophisticated systems are often unable to fully hedge risks
of this size and degree of complexity. Hedge funds share a major proportion
of the CDS market, by taking up to 32% of all CDS contracts, insuring an
exposure of $14.5 trillion. Recent estimates indicate that the entire hedge fund
market has approximately $2.5 trillion in net assets under management. Thus
hedge funds are bearing risk in excess of their ability to pay off the contractual
amount if anything goes wrong2.
When a default occurs, the seller of the protection must take possession of
the defaulted bond at par value or pay the buyer the difference between the par
value and the recovery value of the bond. CDS contracts often change hands
many times, however, there is no guarantee that the current holder, such as a
2By theory, these positions are fully margined and collateralised on a daily basis, which
implies that all daily MTM P&L is locked in and immune from risk from counterparty default,
however, it also implies that all the investors, in the money and out of the money protection
sellers and buyers, are exposed to the same gap risk due to counterparty defaults, which is the
risk of spreads jumping significantly from levels at which posting of collateral took place and
levels at which the contract is terminated. If a major counterparty defaults, credit spreads
are believed to be re-priced significantly and immediately.
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hedge fund, will have the assets to pay out in the event of a default.
Moody’s Investors Service said in a report released in late May 2008 that
counterparty risks in the CDS market pose greater potential threats to banks
and dealers than other OTC derivatives, such as interest rate swaps. While
banks can spread risk around the globe with CDS trades, it is the interconnected
nature of the market that could pose a systematic risk to the financial system,
according to Moody’s.
"The most significant systemic risk posed by CDS is the effect the failure of a
major counterparty, such as a large universal bank or securities firm, would have
on the operational integrity and pricing in the markets for CDS and, potentially,
the underlying securities, such as corporate bonds", the rating agency said in
its report as quoted in Platt, G. (2008). Such counterparty risk was highlighted
by the collapse of Bear Stearns in 2008. The firm was a major participant in
the CDS market. In May 2005 price swings in the credit derivatives market
following the downgrades of Ford Motor and General Motors debt caused hedge
funds to lose between $1 billion and $2 billion and raised fears of a wider financial
meltdown.
Moody’s says the sheer size of the market does not pose an undue concern in
and of itself. The real danger, according to the rating agency, is that if a large
counterparty failed, this would cause a major re-pricing throughout the CDS
market and depress the prices of the underlying bonds of the companies on which
the credit protection is purchased. For actively traded issues, the contractual
CDS notionals are substantially greater than the outstanding corporate debt.
Figure 1.2 below shows the maximum potential loss to both the buyer and
seller of a CDS contract3. The maximum potential loss to the seller of protection
is the contract premium for the rest of the contract duration, whereas the buyer
of protection could arguably lose the full notional amount of the contract (in
case of a joint default of the counterparty and the reference entity with zero
3Although we could add the caveat that netting agreements and collateral posting could
significantly reduce estimated losses, data on netted exposures is very hard to obtain, therefore
the figures above are un-netted.
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Figure 1.2: Maximum potential loss to either party of a CDS contract
referencing a corporate credit (based on 25 January 2008 data). As shown,
counterparty risk is highly skewed towards the buyer of CDS protection.
recovery). Therefore, counterparty risk is more of a concern for the buyer of
protection.
At a basic level and assuming no collateral has been exchanged, in the event
of a failure of a counterparty the protection buyer may face one of the following
scenarios:
• The original contract is out-of-money, in which case the survivor closes out
the position with the default party by paying off its obligations and then
enters into a new contract with a different counterparty. No profit or loss
incurs in this case by the survivor due to the default of the counterparty.
• The original contract is in-the-money, in which case the survivor closes
out the position with the default party but does not receive its dues. The
survivor incurs a loss equal to the difference between the market value of
the old CDS contract and the new one, this is also called replacement cost.
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1.2 Credit Risk
There are currently two main streams in Credit Risk Modelling: Reduced-form
model and Structural model.
1.2.1 Structural Model
The Structural Model is also called the Merton Model. Merton (1974)[62] intro-
duces the original model, and this leads to the extensive research on structural
models. Merton models a firm’s asset value as a lognormal process and assumes
that the firm would go bankrupt once the asset value, A, falls below the firm’s
debt value, D. The equity value, E, is given as the difference between the asset
value A, and debt value, D.
E = A−D (1.2)
Default is only allowed at one point in time, T. The equity value of the firm,
E, was modelled as a call option on the underlying assets and is given as:
E = AΦ (d1)−De−rTΦ (d2) (1.3)
where
d1 =
ln (A/D) +
(
µ+ 12σ
2
)
T
σ
√
T
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T
where A is the initial value of the firm, D is the default barrier for the
firm, which means the firm will default once the asset value A falls below D, or
say, a firm’s equity value E is negative, at terminal date T . Φ represents the
cumulative normal distribution function. µ is the drift of the asset return, and
σ is the volatility of the asset returns.
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The structural model is particularly useful for practitioners in the credit
portfolio and credit risk management fields. The intuitive interpretation of the
model facilitates consistent discussion regarding a variety of credit risk expo-
sures. It is also possible to apply the structural model to corporate transaction
analysis. In general, the Merton model provides a more realistic concept of a
firm’s financial structure to represent the relationship among asset value, equity
and debt.
One of the principal strengths of the Merton approach is that it makes clear
links between the price of a firm’s debt and observables, which provides spe-
cific testable predictions. However, the empirical evidence for the model and
its various extensions is mixed, Sarig and Warga (1989)[68] demonstrate that
yield spreads vary with maturity in a manner that is roughly consistent with
Merton’s model, whereas Helwege and Turner (1999)[32] argue that this result
is an artifact of the method used to construct the corporate term structure.
Moreover, while direct tests of Merton-style models find that the model un-
derpredicts the level of long-term corporate bond spreads, whereas Lyden and
Saraniti (2000)[60] and Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004)[28] find that some
extensions of the Merton model overpredict spreads for poorly capitalised firms,
but continue to underpredict spreads for large, well-capitalised firms. It is also
well known that structural models severely underpredict yield spreads for bonds
maturing in less than 1 year, besides, the parameters of Merton model are hard
to estimate, because assets’ market value and volatility are difficult to observe.
1.2.2 Reduced-form model
The other major approach of credit risk modelling is called “reduced-form” mod-
els of default. Having less assumptions than structural models, this approach
assumes a firm’s default time is unpredictable or inaccessible and is driven by
a default intensity that is a function of latent state variables. Jarrow, Lando,
and Turnbull (1995)[47], Duffee and Singleton (1999)[26], and Hull and White
(2000)[42] present detailed explanation of several well-known reduced-form mod-
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elling approaches. More and more practitioners in the credit risk trading world
have tendency to apply this model due to its mathematical tractability. Jarrow
and Protter (2004)[46] argue further that reduced-form models are more appro-
priate in an information theoretic context given that it’s very unlikely to have
complete information about the default point and expected recovery rate.
Theoretically, most structural models assume complete information, how-
ever, in practice, the complete information assumption in structural models is
only an approximate way of capturing various economics of a firm. On the
other hand, a reduced-form model has other weaknesses including lack of clear
economic rationale to define the nature of default process, however, it does not
compromise the theoretical issue of complete information.
The empirical validation of reduced-form models is still lacking. The reason
related to lack of theoretical guidance on characterising the default intensity
process. Duffie (1999)[22] found that the parameter estimation using a square-
root approximation can be fairly unstable. Another reason is the bond data, on
which the models are commonly calibrated, typically creates problems as infor-
mation slowly leaks into the price, which results misleading results. The recent
study in credit default swap data provides a new opportunity to understand the
power of both structural and reduced-form model framework.
In reduced form models, the direct reference to the firm’s asset value process
is abandoned. Instead, credit risk is determined by the occurrence of default and
the recovered amount at default. Default is represented by a random stopping
time with a stochastic or deterministic arrival intensity, also known as the hazard
rate, while the recovery rate is usually assumed to be constant, there is no need
to model the hazard rate and recovery components of credit risk separately,
however, it does suffice the process to model the spread.
Arora et al. (2005)[2] from KMV does a empirical comparison study on
structural model, reduced-form model and KMV’s own structural based model.
This paper follows the concept of reduced-form models and will explain
reduced-form models in more details. We extend recent studies by Jarrow and
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Yu (2001)[48] and Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] and refine their approaches by
taking counterparty risk into consideration. We also improve the completeness
of bond information by gathering information from more than one bond of the
underlying defaultable entity.
1.3 Counterparty Risk
1.3.1 Collateralisation
It is standard practice for financial institutions to enter derivative contracts
documented on Master Agreements as recommended by the ISDA (International
Swaps and Derivative Association). All ISDA contract holders are ranked pari
passu to senior debt, in terms of claims on a defaulting counterparty.
Margin agreements require banks to post different levels of collateral on
their outstanding contracts depending on the current mark-to-market of the
contract. Typical acceptable collateral is either cash or highly-rated (AA or
higher) securities. Margin thresholds are usually the previous day’s mark-to-
market for all outstanding contracts, but exceptions might be made for highly-
rated corporates.
Given their higher risk profile, margining for hedge funds tends to be some-
what more stringent. They typically post collateral at 100% of their current
exposure, and furthermore might also be asked to post collateral to cover close-
out risk on their contracts for a certain number of days going forward. The
estimation of forward exposure is done through forecasting future scenarios.
1.3.2 Netting Agreements
Another advantage of trading within the ISDA framework is the provision of
netting. Netting agreements come into action in the case of actual counterparty
default. Without such agreements, a surviving counterparty would legally have
to fully meet its obligations to the defaulting counterparty, while only being left
with a claim on its dues from the same. However, the provision for netting allows
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a bank to calculate its dues to a defaulter by netting out-of-the-money and in-
the-money contracts and to arrive at a single figure for dues. In fact netting
agreements are typically applicable across all derivatives that are traded on
ISDA contracts, effectively building in a natural hedge to counterparty default
risk on a firm-wide level.
Even in the absence of reference entity default, a failure of a major coun-
terparty could lead to losses across the financial system. Upon the default of
the counterparty, OTC derivatives would be immediately and significantly re-
priced, with credit spreads likely to widen dramatically. This means that CDS
contracts would be terminated at a spread significantly higher than the spread
at which collateral was last posted, leading to the crystallisation of significant
losses. Our analysis uses un-netted data, as data on netted exposures is very
hard to obtain.
There are two factors which could cause the realised losses to be larger than
our estimates. The first is the fact that, while we assumed full collateralisation,
in reality, collateralisation is imperfect. This would mean that at the point of
last posting of collateral, there would be some mark-to-market positions which
are not backed by collateral and any losses on these positions would increase
the loss from gap risk. The second is forward margining, any collateral posted
by hedge funds with the defaulting counterparty as part of forward margining
would be subject to a loss. This loss would amount to the value of collateral
less recovery.
If no recovery is possible, the total credit loss will not consist simply of the
amount of the next payment due under the terms of the swap contract but will
equal the present value of the net interest payments over the remaining life of the
contract. This amount is termed the replacement cost of the derivative contract.
The replacement cost of a derivative contract is the appropriate measure of the
credit loss resulting from the default of one’s counterparty. If the derivative
contract has a positive mark-to-market value to the non-defaulting counterparty,
then the replacement cost of the amount that counterparty would have to pay
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in the market to obtain a derivative contract with the same terms. However,
if default occurs on derivative contracts with negative mark-to-market values
to the non-defaulting counterparty, then that counterparty is typically not free
to walk away from these transactions and reap a windfall gain. This condition
implies that the replacement cost of a derivative contract is equal to the greater
of zero and the current mark-to-market value of the contract.
In our analysis we have concentrated solely on credit derivatives. However,
in terms of amounts outstanding, credit derivatives constitute only 8% of all
the OTC derivatives, with interest rate derivatives constituting the largest pro-
portion of 67%. We believe that a default of a major counterparty would cause
a significant re-pricing in all OTC derivatives. Given the enormous amounts
outstanding of these derivatives, netted exposures could be large and therefore
gap risk losses on other OTC derivatives could be significant.
1.4 Contribution
In this thesis, an intensity-based approach to the modelling of correlated default
is presented. Under the framework of the reduced-form model, default is an un-
predictable jump with an exogenously specified hazard rate process, also called
intensity. We adapt the contagious default framework proposed by Jarrow and
Yu (2001)[48] and apply the change of measure technique introduced in Collin-
Dufresne (2002)[11] in their valuation procedures. However, instead of discrete
premium payment which represents the fraction of time interval between succes-
sive payment dates as in Leung and Kwok (2005)[55], we simplify the calculation
by extending it to continuous premium payment, the results derived are much
more indicative in terms of explanatory power for individual variables.
Firstly, a two-firm model is investigated in Chapter 3, which means only the
reference entity and the protection seller are due to default. We derive the joint
density of default times as well as the marginal survival probability. We then
calculate the swap premium in continuous payment environment by relaxing
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the assumptions about the protection buyer being obliged to make continuous
premium payment at the swap rate till maturity of the contract.
In Chapter 4 we extend the contagion model into three-firm model, which
involves the impact of default induced by the protection buyer. We found that
the default of the protection buyer does not place a big impact on the premium
rate, which agrees with the nature of the CDS contract. At last, instead of as-
suming the intensities are constant before jump caused by other party’s default,
we relax the assumption by making it time-variant, we present the up turn and
down turn of the economic cycle by making the intensity rate follow a wave
shape.
In Chapter 5, an empirical study is carried out based on the time series of
credit spread on 55 companies between July 2004 - June 2007, we compare the
spreads derived from the bond market and the one from CDS market, we found
that credit market provides a better indication of credit risk in terms of liquidity
and faster response to market information, we also found the credit spreads de-
rived from both of the market bear counterparty risk, which means their “real”
spread should be even higher than the one from CDS market. A counterparty
spread proxy is then constructed, by taking the difference between the 5-year
swap rates and the 5-year risk-free rate (Euro Benchmark curve in this case)
and apply the counterparty spread on top of credit spread from CDS or Bond
market, to reveal the true default intensity of the underlying entity.
In Chapter 6, we study the counterparty risk during the credit crunch period
from July 2007 until June 2009, using the same framework for counterparty
spread, and find much higher counterparty risk during the crisis time due to
the lack of confidence from investors on default or other credit events of major
financial institutions. We then extend our observation from 5 year maturity
spread onto the term structure of CDS spread from 1 year to 10 years maturity,
and investigate the shape of term structure for counterparty spread, we found
great similarity of the counterparty spread shape to the shape of term structure
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of instantaneous volatility for Libor Market Model, whose calibration was first
introduced by Rebonato (2006)[65] and then improved by adding a regime-
switching, stochastic volatility feature to the model. We found out that the term
structure for counterparty spread shows a flat or a humped hockey stick shape,
until when the market comes to an “excited” stage, where the term structure
shows a downward decreasing shape.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The content of this thesis is organised as follow:
Chapter 1 states background of credit risk and motivation to study coun-
terparty risk based on credit derivatives, it briefly outlines the contribution
of the thesis. Chapter 2 is the literature review. Chapter 3 studies the con-
tagion model introduced by Jarrow & Yu (2001)[48] and extends the frame-
work into continuous-time using the change of measure technique. Chapter 4
extends the contagion model from 2-firm to 3-firm, which involves a default-
able protection buyer. Chapter 5&6 carries out an empirical study, where the
credit spread is modelled as a mean-reverting, strictly positive process, as in
Cox–Ingersoll–Ross. A proxy is constructed for counterparty spread in order
to add on top of credit spread from the CDS market. Chapter 7 carries out
the empirical study using the Cox–Ingersoll–Ross framework and investigates
the counterparty spread during credit crunch period. The term structure of
counterparty spread is then modelled in Chapter 8 using the regime-switching,
stochastic volatility Libor Market Model introduced by Rebonato & Kainth
(2003). Chapter 9 concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we go through the literature for each substantial topic involved in
this thesis, in order to provide an introduction and deeper insight of the models
applied in the thesis.
2.1 Contagion
A number of articles have been done to study analytically on counterparty
risk. Brigo & Chourdakis (2008)[6] model credit spread volatility and take de-
fault correlation into account, this is considered important when the underlying
reference contract is a CDS, as the counterparty credit valuation adjustment
involves CDS options, and modelling options without volatility in the underly-
ing asset is undesirable. They investigate the impact of the reference volatility
on the counterparty adjustment as a fundamental feature that is not studied in
other approaches.
Differently from the intensity based approach, Hull and White (2001)[43]
characterise credit risk by constructing a credit index for each company and
model the default by the event that the credit index hits a certain barrier.
This approach generalises the structural model originally proposed by Merton
(1974)[62] to consider all credit information of a firm including its asset value and
26
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its credit rating. In order to avoid the complicated calculation of the default
probability, they assume that generally a credit index process can be trans-
formed to a Wiener process, which is in doubt since it implies that the credit
risk is independent of the risk-free security market. They also assume a flat
term structure of interest rates which does not reflect the market risk and its
association with other factors.
Kim & Kim (2003)[50] develop a methodology for valuing CDSs that takes
account of counterparty risk as well as market and credit risk. It incorporates
market risk into determining default correlations between multiple firms using
the first-passage-time approach, based on structural approach with stochastic
interest rate (market risk). Their model under market and credit risk correlation
is applied to the valuation of vanilla credit default swaps with counterparty
default risk, and to the valuation of basket credit default swap.
Distinct from all these methods, Chen and Filipovic (2003)[9] model the risk-
free rates, credit indices and default events altogether by a multi-dimensional
affine process. In this way, not only can the dynamics of a credit index be
extended from a Wiener process to any affine process (including affine jump-
diffusion processes), but also this generalised affine model provides us an analyt-
ical framework to consider all the essential concerns mentioned before because
of the analytical tractability and the rich structure of affine Markov processes.
Moreover, they have demonstrated that this model can produce explicit formulas
for the prices of default swaps and other credit derivatives.
Walker (2006)[72] approximates an analytical solution to a Markov model
describing transitions between the states of a basket of two obligors, this al-
lows easy calibration to the market prices of the bonds for individual obligors.
It determines two of the model parameters which describe the dependence be-
tween the two obligors. This analytical formula for the spread of a CDS with
counterparty risk can in principle be used to determine one of the two depen-
dency parameters of the model from market data on the price of the CDS. He
also compares results of a time-dependent default-correlation coefficient with
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results obtained using the market-standard Gaussian copula model, it is con-
cluded that the market-standard model is very limited in its ability to price
correlation-sensitive derivatives, these limitations could be largely overcome by
using a time-dependent Gaussian copula correlation coefficient.
Jarrow & Yu (2001)[48] propose a contagion default model, which considers
the credit risk induced by the interdependence among firms by generalising
the intensity based model to allow a firm to be exposed to some firm-specific
default risk, as well as to common risk factors. However, due to the complexity
of the analysis, they confine the discussion to the situation where the default
intensity follows a simple primary-secondary framework process and only price
the idealised default swaps by assuming that each party within the contract is
obligated to pay until its own default, regardless of whether the other party has
defaulted or not.
Later on, Yu (2004)[74] uses the “total hazard” approach to construct the
default processes from independent and identically distributed exponential ran-
dom variables. An analytical expression of the joint distribution of default times
is obtained in his two-firm and three-firm contagion models. In a copula-based
approach that combines ingredients of a reduced-form model, Schonbucher and
Schubert (2001)[69] propose a modification of the default time with Ei following
a joint distribution C
(
U1, . . . , U I
)
, where U i = exp
(−Ei) and C is a copula
function. Yu shows that his approach can be considered as an extension of the
Schonbucher and Schubert construction where the copula function is indexed by
the sample path of X. In other words, the Schonbucher and Schubert construc-
tion is a special case of Yu’s approach where the copula function is invariant to
the history of X.
However, despite the intuition of the framework, Yu places several assump-
tions on the payment structure in order to simplify his calculations. Firstly,
the protection buyer is assumed to make continuous premium payments at the
swap rate till expiration, provided that the buyer does not default prior to expiry,
which does not perfectly represent the market practice that the swap terminates
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upon default of any one of the three parties. Secondly, the protection seller is
assumed to make the contingent compensation payment on the expiration date,
provided that the protection seller survives beyond the expiration date of the
swap.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Hugonnier (2002)[11] show that the Duffie
and Singleton (1999)[26] pricing formula can be preserved even when the no-
jump condition is violated, if one changes to a measure that places zero prob-
ability on default prior to the maturity of the claim. This formula has been
applied to derive analytic solutions for defaultable bond prices in a setting with
two issuers. However, it is not clear whether it can be applied to more general
settings such as a large number of issuers or where the defaultable claim is of
the basket type.
An analytic solution for the CDS premium framework introduced by Jarrow
and Yu (2001)[48] is provided by Leung and Kwok (2005)[55]. They employ the
change of measure introduced in Collin-Dufresne (2004)[11] in their valuation
procedure. Using the change of measure, the counterparty risk model is re-
duced to the standard reduced form model. This approach provides less tedious
analytical derivations compared to the total hazard construction Yu proposed.
Yu (2007)[75] himself also presents a procedure where the CGH formula can be
applied to derive the marginal distribution of default times in the presence of
an arbitrary number of correlated defaults.
Apart from all the studies above, Bai, Hu and Ye (2007)[3] argue it is unre-
alistic to assume that one firm’s default intensity keeps a constant jump after
the other firm defaults. They introduce a geometric function to reflect the at-
tenuation speed of impact of one firm’s default to its counterparty. They argue
that if two firms are co-partners, the default intensity of one firm will increase
abruptly when the other firm defaults, as time goes on, the impact will decrease
gradually until extinct as time goes on.
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2.2 Cox–Ingersoll–Ross Model
In order to discover the dynamic of CDS spread in Chapter 5 and 6, a number
of papers have been studied to spot the determinants of corporate yield spreads,
this section also provide the literature that has been done in the area of liquidity
risk.
The Duffie & Singleton (1999)[26] framework is used to specify that the
instantaneous credit spread equals the product of the risk-neutral jump intensity
and the loss rate. Each firm’s default intensity is modelled as a function of
latent common factors and a latent firm-specific factor. In line with the results
from Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)[59] and Duffie (1999)[22], the model allows
for correlation between credit spreads and default-free interest rates, which are
modelled using a two-factor “essentially affine” model. The model also corrects
for tax difference between corporate and government bonds, and a liquidity
factor that is based on the corporate bond age. Yu (2002)[73] also provides a
decomposition of corporate bond returns using the intensity-based framework of
Duffie and Singleton, however, he did not estimate the size of the components.
The first analysis of conditional diversification is performed by Jarrow et
al. (2001)[45], however, they do not estimate the default event risk premium.
They use the estimate of Duffie’s (1999)[22] model to compare the model-implied
default probabilities with the default probabilities that are implied by an annual
Markov migration model. It is shown that the use of the Markov migration
model leads to downward biased estimates of the default jump risk premium.
In order to fit structural firm value models to historical rates and the eq-
uity premium, and compare model-implied and observed credit spreads, Huang
and Huang (2002)[40] find that the implied credit spreads by all the models are
too low for investment grade firms. The risk premia generated by these mod-
els, mostly based on a diffusion process for changes in the firm value, can be
interpreted as risk premia on common changes in firm values, or equivalently,
credit spreads. They find about 30% explanatory power for the risk premia
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of the BBB-rated credit spread. They also consider a model that incorporates
systematic jumps in the firm value.
A firm value framework is employed by Delianedis and Geske (2001)[19], to
assess the influence of several factors on the level of credit spread, including
jump, tax, and liquidity factors, however, they study only on the level of credit
spreads, and do not use historical default rates. They argue that priced jumps
in firm value cannot solely explain the high level of credit spreads, although
they do not empirically decompose the credit spread into all the factors.
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003)[12] propose a theoretical model where a large
upward jump in a firm’s credit spread causes a moderate market-wide jump in
the credit spreads of other firms, known as the contagion effect. They distinguish
the direct jump risk premium from the contagion risk premium. Collin-Dufresne
et al. perform a calibration to obtain an indication of the size of the jump and
contagion risk premium.
A new dataset of bid and offer quotes for credit swap spreads is used by
Ericsson et al. (2005)[29] to investigate the relationship between theoretical
determinants of default risk, such as firm leverage, volatility and the riskless
interest rate, and actual market premia using linear regression. They find that
estimated coefficients for these variables are consistent with theory and that the
estimates are highly significant both statistically and economically. They con-
clude that leverage, volatility and the risk-free rate are important determinants
of credit default swap premia as predicted.
2.3 Liquidity Risk
Recent research has shown that default risk accounts for only a part of the total
yield spread on risky corporate bonds relative to their risk-less benchmarks. One
candidate for the unexplained portion of the spread is a premium for liquidity.
A few researchers have studied liquidity risk, or joint liquidity risk together with
default risk.
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Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell (2006)[56] study how the market prices the
default and liquidity risks incorporated into an interest rate swap spread. Trea-
sury, repo and swap term structures are jointly modelled using a five-factor
affine framework and estimate the model by maximum likelihood. In their pa-
per, the credit spread is driven by a persistent liquidity process and a rapidly
mean-reverting default intensity process. They found that the credit premium
for all but the shortest maturities is primarily compensation for liquidity risk,
and the term structure of liquidity premia increases steeply while that of default
premia is almost flat. Both liquidity and default premia vary significantly over
time.
As shown in Figure 2.1, they found that the credit spread in swaps consists
of both a liquidity component and a default component. On average, the default
component of the credit spread is larger, but the liquidity component is slightly
more volatile. Both components vary significantly over time. The liquidity com-
ponent display a high level of persistence. In contrast, the default component is
rapidly mean reverting. In addition, the default component exhibits a number
of large but temporary spikes in its level over time.
In order to explore the role of liquidity risk in the pricing of corporate bonds.
De Jong and Driessen (2005)[18] employs bid-ask spread of long-term US trea-
sury bonds to measure liquidity. They show that liquidity is a priced factor in
a multifactor model for the expected returns on corporate bonds. The corpo-
rate bond returns have significant exposures to fluctuations in treasury bond
liquidity and equity market liquidity. Furthermore, the associated liquidity risk
premia help to explain the credit spread puzzle. They discovered for the US
market, the total estimated liquidity premium is around 45 basis points for
long-maturity investment grade bonds; whereas for speculative grade bonds,
which are exposured to higher liquidity risk, the liquidity premium is around
100 basis points. Similar evidence is found for the liquidity risk exposure of
corporate bonds using a sample of European corporate bond prices.
An empirical study of market prices of credit default swaps in comparison
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Figure 2.1: Liquidity and Default Components of the Credit Spread
The top panel plots the liquidity component of the spread. The middle panel
plots the default component of the spread. The bottom panel plots the sum
of the liquidity and default components which equals the credit spread. All
time series are measured in basis point. The sample period is January 1988 to
February 2002. Source: Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell (2006)
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with model prices is carried out by Houweling and Vorst (2005)[39]. They show
that a simple reduced-form model gives more accurate estimates of default swap
premiums than the bond’s yield spreads. Moreover, they shed light on the
choice of the default-free term structure of interest rates. Their model yields
unbiased premium estimates for default swaps on investment grade issuers, but
only if swap or repo rates are used, as they state that swap and repo curves
significantly outperform the government curve as proxy for default-free interest
rates. Their paper confirms that financial markets no longer see Treasury bonds
as the default-free benchmark empirically.
Feldhütter and Lando (2008)[31] also attempt to decompose the swap spreads
through a joint pricing model for treasury securities, corporate bonds and swap
rates using six latent factors, and decompose swap spreads into three compo-
nents: a convenience yield (liquidity) from holding Treasury securities; a credit
spread arising from the credit risk element in LIBOR rates, which define the
floating-rate payments of interest rate swaps; and a factor specific to the swap
market. The convenience yield, which separates the Treasury yield from the
riskless rate, is by far the largest component of the swap spreads. The other
two components separate the swap rate from the riskless rate. The credit risk
component does not contribute much to the time variation of spreads.
A discernible contribution from credit risk exists as well as from a swap-
specific factor with higher variability which in certain periods is related to hedg-
ing activity in the MBS (mortgage-backed security) market. Their model also
sheds lights on the relation between hazard rates and the spread between LI-
BOR rates and General Collateral repo rates and on the level of the riskless rate
compared to swap and treasury rates.
A more structural approach is adapted by Shin (2008)[70] to explore the
pricing of debt in a financial system, where the assets that borrowers hold to
meet their obligations include claims against other borrowers. Accessing finan-
cial claims in a system context captures features that are missing in a partial
equilibrium setting, such as liquidity spillovers across financial institutions re-
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sulting from expansions and contractions of balance sheets. Aggregate liquidity
can be seen as the rate of growth of a financial sector’s balance sheets. The fo-
cus of Shin’s paper is on the liquidity of the financial system as a whole, where
“liquidity” refers to the funding conditions for current and potential borrowers.
For existing borrowers, rising asset prices strengthen their balance sheets and
make them more credit worthy. For potential borrowers, the stronger balance
sheets of financial intermediaries play to their advantage. His framework is eas-
ily extended to deal with claims of differing seniority classes, and is well-suited
to pricing complex debt instruments such as CDOs (collateralised debt obliga-
tions), since CDOs are obligations that are backed by claims on others. His
model is also well-suited to quantitative analysis of risks such as value-at-risk
calculations that take account of endogenous changes in asset prices and the
feedback effects that result.
In contrast to previous evidence from corporate bond data, Ericsson and
Reneby (2007)[29] evaluate the price of default protection for a sample of US
corporations using a set of structural models. They found that CDS premia are
not systematically underestimated. They perform the same exercise for bond
spreads by the same issuer on the same trading date for a robustness test, which
shows that bond spreads relative to the Treasury curve are systematically un-
derestimated, which is not the case when the swap curve is used as a benchmark,
suggesting the previous documented underestimation results may be sensitive
to the choice of risk free rate. They explain the reason why the swap curve
outperforms the treasury curve is that the swap curve lies closer to the cost of
funding for traders in the bond market.
2.4 Corporate Bond Yield Spreads
Corporate Bond yield spread has been used as an alternative method in order
to observe default risk, liquidity risk together with other risk factors from the
bond market.
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Nashikkar et al. (2007)[63] investigate the possibility of the existence of
liquidity risk by relating the liquidity of corporate bond prices to the basis
between the credit default swap spreads of the issuer and the par-equivalent
corporate bond yield spread. A measure to assess a bond called latent liquidity
is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the bond, where
the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. They find that bonds with
higher latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts, after
controlling for other realised measures of liquidity. By documenting the positive
effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond basis, they also find
that several firm-level variables related to credit risk negatively affect the basis,
which indicates that the CDS price does not fully capture the credit risk of the
bond. Furthermore, when default risk of a firm is high, its illiquid bonds are
more expensive. Their findings are consistent with limits to arbitrage between
the CDS and bond markets, due to the cost of shorting bonds.
They have shown that the liquidity of the CDS contract, as measured both
by the bid-ask spread, and the riskiness of the CDS market (as measured by
the CDS market volatility), both of which have explanatory power for the basis
of bonds over and above bond-specific liquidity variables, which shows evidence
that bond market participants account for the liquidity of the CDS market when
they price corporate bonds, due to the ease to hedge their positions. As the
CDS market becomes more and more liquid, the CDS-bond basis is expected
to decrease over time. They have also shown that the CDS price does not fully
account for the effect of credit risk on bond prices, several firm-level effects that
are related to credit risk seem to have explanatory power over the CDS-bond
basis.
The components of corporate credit spreads are analysed by Delianedis and
Geske (2001)[19] using a structural model, which offers a framework to under-
stand the decomposition. They believe that default risk may correctly represent
only a small portion of corporate credit spreads. They conclude that credit risk
and credit spreads are not primarily explained by default and recovery risk, but
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are mainly attributable to taxes, jumps, liquidity, and market risk factors.
The determinants of very short-term corporate yield spreads is studied by
Covitz and Downing (2007)[13], who employ a comprehensive database on trans-
actions of commercial paper issued by domestic U.S. non-financial corporations.
They find that liquidity plays a role in the determination of spreads but credit
quality is more important as a determinant of spreads, even at horizons of less
than 1 month. Their results are sound across a variety range of proxies for
liquidity and credit risk, and show important implications for the literature on
the modelling of corporate bond prices.
Elton et al. (2001)[27] show that expected default losses and tax effect cannot
explain the observed level of credit spread. They explain part of this fitting
error by relating corporate bond returns to equity market factors. However,
Driessen (2005)[20] uses a latent factor model instead of the Fama-French factor
model as in Elton et al. (2001)[27]. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)[11] show that
observable economic and financial variables (including equity returns) cannot
explain the correlation of credit spread changes across firms. Moreover, Elton
et al. (2001)[27] do not incorporate a default event risk premium or a liquidity
factor.
A similar study is done by Chen et al. (2007)[10] based on corporate yield
spreads and bond liquidity using a battery of liquidity measures covering over
4,000 corporate bonds spanning both investment grade and speculative cat-
egories. They find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads, and
an improvement in liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads.
Their results hold after controlling for common bond-specific, firm-specific, and
macroeconomic variables, and are robust to issuer’s fixed effect and potential
endogeneity bias. Their findings justify the concern as in Collin-Dufresne et
al. (2002)[11] and Huang and Huang (2003)[40], that neither the level nor the
change in the yield spread of corporate bonds over Treasury bonds can be fully
explained by the credit risk determinants proposed by structural form models.
They also find inconsistency in statistical evidence of a tax effect, in line with
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Longstaff et al. (2005)[58], or an equity volatility effect for investment grade
bonds, and little evidence of these effects for speculative grade bonds.
Chen et al. (2007)[10] contribute to the growing debate over liquidity’s
influence on asset pricing and corporate finance decisions, with implications for
both domestic and equity markets. Specifically, the issue of a liquidity premium
on returns may now find common ground in both bond and equity markets.
Furthermore, the evidence of a liquidity effect on corporate yield spreads may
shed light on sovereign debt yield spread determinants.
2.5 Comparison between Bond Market and CDS
market spread
Credit default swap spreads are an interesting alternative to bond prices in
empirical research on credit ratings for two reasons:
a. The CDS spread data provided via a broker consists of firm bid and offer
quotes from dealers, once a quote has been made, the dealer is committed to
trading a minimum principal ($10m) at the quoted price. On the other hand,
the bond yield data usually consist of indications from dealers. There is no
commitment from the dealer to trade at the specified price.
b. The second attraction of CDS spreads is that no adjustment is required
- they are already credit spreads, whereas bond yields require an assumption
about the appropriate benchmark risk-free rate before they can be converted
into credit spreads, the usual practice of calculating the credit spread as the
excess of the bond yield over a chosen risk-free benchmark.
Hull, Predescu, and White (2004)[41] examine the relationship between
credit default swap spreads and bond yields and reach conclusions on the bench-
mark risk-free rate by using a risk-free rate about 10 basis points less than the
swap rate. They then carried out a series of tests to explore the extent to which
credit rating announcements by Moody’s are anticipated by participants in the
credit swap market.
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An empirical comparison of credit spreads between the bond market and
the CDS market is done by Zhu (2004)[77] on how the two markets interact
with each other. He confirms the theoretical prediction that the two spreads
should be on average equal to each other, however, in the short run, there are
significant price discrepancies, which is largely due to their different responses
to change in the credit quality of reference entities. He also finds that market
participants seem to use swap rates rather than treasury rates as the proxy for
risk-free rates, he shows the failure of treasury rates to be the proxy for risk-free
rates could be largely attributed to tax considerations. Overall, the derivatives
market seems to lead the cash market in anticipating rating events and in price
adjustment. His empirical study also suggests that the relative importance of the
two markets in price discovery can vary substantially across entity’s liquidity
matters. There is also evidence of market segmentation in that U.S. entities
behave very differently from those in other regions. Finally, he finds that the
existence of a delivery option in CDS contracts and the short-sale restriction in
the cash market only have minor impacts on credit risk pricing.
The swap rate is taken as the risk-free rate in Blance et al. (2003)[4], and
they find credit default swap spreads to be quite close to bond yield spreads.
They also find that the default swap market leads the bond market so that
most price discovery occurs in the credit swap market. On the other hand,
Houweling and Vorst (2005)[39] argue that market participants no longer see
the treasury curve as the risk-free curve and instead use the swap curve and/or
the repo curve, they confirm that the credit default swap market appears to use
the swap rate rather than the treasury rate as the risk-free rate. The result of
Hull et al. (2004)[41] is consistent with Vorst’s findings, they estimate that the
market is using a risk-free rate about 10 basis points less than the swap rate to
allow for the fact that the payoff does not reimburse the buyer of protection for
accrued interest on bonds.
Elton et al. (2001)[27] decompose spot rates on corporate bonds into ex-
pected loss, taxes and residual. They examine how much of the variation over
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time in the residual spread can be explained by systematic risk factors, and cal-
culate a risk premium based on these contributions. The more recent paper by
Driessen (2005)[20] employs different methods and data to further decompose
spreads into taxes, risk premium and liquidity premium.
Attempting to explain the precise relationship between credit default spread
and credit risk, Amato and Remolona (2003)[1] did a comparison study with
Elton et al. (2001)[27] and Driessen (2005)[20], they argue that the answer to
the credit spread puzzle might lie in the difficulty of diversifying default risk.
They review existing evidence on the determinants of credit spreads, including
the role of taxes, risk premia and liquidity premia. In the end they suggest that
the spreads are largely a compensation for the risk of unexpected losses from
default that are invariably present in corporate bond portfolios.
In Chapter 5, the main argument/development is based on the framework
Longstaff et al. (2005)[58], who study default risk over instruments such as
interest rate swaps or credit default swaps, and find that using repo curve or
swap curve provides a better fit than treasury curves, however, they also ignore
the impact of counterparty risk, i.e. insurance company, investment banks, or
even hedge funds, whose own default is at risk. The reason swap rates, or say,
LIBOR curve provides a good fit on CDS spreads fitting models, is that they
both ignored the underlying counterparty default risk, which is embedded in
both LIBOR rates and CDS prices. Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] also find there is
a big difference between the spread obtained from the CDS market and spread
generated by using bracketing bonds from the corporate bond market for the
same underlying reference entity. They then state that counterparty risk cannot
fully explain the difference between the spreads.
In Chapter 5, our model is developed to add counterparty spread onto CDS
spreads from the market, by keeping the government bond rates as risk-free rate,
we brought the counterparty-risk adjusted CDS spread onto the same platform
as the spread generated by the bond market, and find much less difference
between the two, which makes default risk a bigger component than previous
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 41
studies and liquidity risk count not as a big proportion of the total spread.
2.6 Term Structure of Counterparty Spread
In this section we introduce the literature for the final chapter, which studies
counterparty risk effect during the credit crunch period.
Firstly we compared our counterparty risk proxy with the one Mercurio
(2009)[61] introduces in his paper. Mercurio (2009)[61] describes the major
changes that occurred in the quotes of market rates after 2007 sub-prime mort-
gage crisis and comments on the missing analogies and consistencies of those
rates, and hints on a possible, simple way to formally reconcile them, part of
which mentioned the discrepancy of “last” one-month EONIA rates and one-
month deposit rates, from November 14th, 2005 to November 12,2008, it can
be observed that the basis was well below 10 basis points until August 2007,
however, since then started to move erratically around different levels, which is
believed to be due to counterparty risk.
Now the FRA cannot be priced as a trivial forward on a LIBOR rate, as it
used to be, at least approximately. One possible explanation is the increased per-
ception of bank-vs-bank counterparty/liquidity risk after the burst of sub-prime
crisis. The presence of counterparty/liquidity risk in LIBOR market quotes is
often estimated based on the difference between LIBOR rates and rates the-
oretically free of such counterparty/liquidity risk, such as EONIA. Thus now
the risk-free rate is taken to be EONIA, whereas LIBOR would be a different
default risky rate. All those rates, which were very closely interconnected, sud-
denly became different objects, each one incorporating their own liquidity or
credit premium.
In second half of Chapter 6, we extend our counterparty risk proxy from spot
5-year maturity to a 1-to-10 year time horizon, which forms a term structure of
the counterparty risk, we find the shape of the term structure of counterparty
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spread shares a great similarity to what Joshi & Rebonato (2001)[65] introduce
for the instantaneous volatility term structure for Libor Market Model (LMM).
Joshi & Rebonato (2001)[49] present an extension of the Libor Market Model,
which allows the stochastic instantaneous volatility of the forward rates in a
displaced diffusion setting. They successfully extend the deterministic volatility
case to the stochastic volatility case while keeping all the powerful and impor-
tant approximations. They also show that the market caplet surface across
strikes and maturities can be well recovered even after reducing the number of
the possible fitting parameters.
The model is later improved in Rebonato & Kainth (2003) to become a
two-regime, Markov chain extension of the LMM model, where the unobserv-
able instantaneous-volatility process migrates between two states, one of which
is associated with the parameters that give a monotonically-decreasing term
structure of the instantaneous volatility, and the other with the parameters as-
sociate with a humped shape. Rebonato (2006)[65] suggests that a two-regime
Markov chain approach may be more successful and better financially motivated,
more generally, his study highlights the shortcomings of purely time-dependent
or time-homogeneous approaches. He concludes that neither time-homogeneity
nor time-dependence constitute a desirable modelling approach, and that the
possibility of the instantaneous volatility migrating between a normal to an ex-
cited state is likely to be a necessary ingredient for a convincing description of
the dynamics of the swaption surface.
2.7 Summary of Literature Review
This chapter summarises and review the studies that have been done related to
the main subjects within this thesis. We first go through the papers working on
the analytical solution of the counterparty risk, as discussed in Chapter 3 and
4; Reviews are done on subjects such as Cox–Ingersoll–Ross Model, liquidity
risk, and comparison between spreads in CDS market and bond market, they
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are intensively studied and developed in Chapter 5; The final section of this
chapter introduces the term structure of the instantaneous volatility for Libor
Market Model, a building block for our study in Chapter 6 and 7.
Chapter 3
Contagion Model
Notation of Variables
τ stopping time in reduced-form model
λ default intensity
X exogenous state variable
E a unit exponential random variable assumed to be independent of
X
Nt a Cox process presenting default, with intensity λ
P equivalent martingale (risk-neutral) measure
N i default processes of the firm i in the economy
Ft filtration process generated collectively by the information contained
in the state variables and the default processes
p (t, T ) time-t price of a default-free zero-coupon bond
B (t) bond price
V i (t, T ) defaultable bond price
44
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Et (·) the expectation conditional on time-t information Ft
V i (t, T ) the defaultable bond price
δi recovery rate
rt denote the spot interest rate process adapted to FXt
λBt default intensity of protection seller
λCt default intensity of reference entity
b0, c0 positive constants, default intensity for B/C without jump
b1, c1 positive constants, jump intensity when firm C/B defaults
Sit (T ) conditional survival probabilities
ZiT a uniformly integrable P-martingale with respect to F i
EC the expectation taken under the measure PC
p swap premium
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In this chapter, we study and extend the contagion two-firm model introduced
by Jarrow and Yu (2001)[48], explain the original intuition of their framework
as well as the shortcomings in the process of deriving an analytical solution for
the CDS premium, which compensates the original two-direction contagion by
introducing a primary-secondary framework instead. We simplify the derivation
to an analytical solution using the change of measure technique by Collins-
Dufresne et al. (2002)[11]. This differs from other approaches up to date, since
instead of following the discrete payment setup, we integrate the swap premium
calculation up to a continuous payment environment, which, as we can see at the
end of this chapter, provides a much simpler and meaningful premium result.
3.1 Contagion Model
The model introduced by Jarrow and Yu (2001)[48] generalises Lando (1994,
1998)[51, 53] to include counterparty default risk. Under the framework of
contagious defaults, the default risk is determined by an exogenously specific
instantaneous default intensity. The contagious defaults are triggered by inter-
dependent default risk structure between the parties, where the default intensity
of one party jumps up when the default of another party occurs.
In order to discuss the contagion model, we begin with the description of a
typical reduced-form model, which it is customary to associate with a stopping
time τ :
τ = inf
{
t :
ˆ t
0
λsds ≥ E
}
. (3.1)
where λ is called the default intensity and assumed to be dependent on ex-
ogenous state variables X, and E is a unit exponential random variable assumed
to be independent of X. Nt = 1{t≥τ} is defined as a Cox process presenting
default, with intensity λ. In a setting with multiple default times
{
τ i
}I
i=1
, one
can extend the above definition to a collection of independent unit exponential
random variables
{
Ei
}I
i=1
, which implies that the default times are indepen-
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dent conditional on the information contained in X, and default correlations
arise because of the correlations of the intensities.
3.2 Definition of Default Process and Change of
measure technique
3.2.1 Construction of Default Process
Consider that uncertainty in an infinite horizon economy is represented by a
filtered probability space
(
Ω,F , {F}Tt=0 ,P
)
where F = FT , P is an equivalent
martingale (risk-neutral) measure under which all security prices discounted by
the risk-free interest rate process are martingales, so that bond markets are
complete and priced by arbitrage, as shown in discrete time by Harrison and
Kreps (1979)[35] and in continuous time by Harrison and Pliska (1981)[36].
On this probability space there is an Rd-valued process Xt, which represents d
economy-wide state variables. There are also I point processes, N i, i = 1, ..., I,
initialised at 0. These represent the default processes of the I firms in the
economy such that the default of the ith firm occurs when N i jumps from 0 to
1.
The filtration is generated collectively by the information contained in the
state variables and the default processes:
Ft = FXt ∨ F1t ∨ · · · ∨ FIt , (3.2)
where
FXt = σ (Xs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t) and F it = σ
(
N is, 0 ≤ s ≤ t
)
. (3.3)
are the filtrations generated by Xt and N it , respectively.
We use the Cox framework (doubly stochastic Poisson processes) to specify
the random default times:
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τ i = inf
{
t :
ˆ t
0
λisds ≥ Ei
}
. (3.4)
where
{
Ei
}
i∈I is a set of independent unit exponential random variables.
Further assumptions are made that τ ipossesses a strictly positive Ft-predictable
intensity λit with right continuous sample paths such that
M it = Nt −
ˆ t∧τ i
0
λisds = Nt −
ˆ t
0
1{τ i>s}λisds. (3.5)
is a (P,Ft)-martingale for some strictly positive, FXt -adapted process λit
where t ∧ τ i = min (t, τ i) , and “1” is the indicator function.
Given the above definition, the conditional survival probability of firm i is
given by
P
[
τ i > T | Ft
]
= exp
(
−
ˆ T
t
λisds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ] , (3.6)
and P
[
τ i > T
]
= E
[
exp
(
−
ˆ T
t
λisds
)]
. t ∈ [0, T ] . (3.7)
This framework can be used in deriving a pricing formula for defaultable
bonds, as described by Jarrow & Yu (2001)[48], which extends Lando (1994)[51].
3.2.2 Recovery Rate
The second ingredient in the modeling of defaultable securities is the recovery
rate. There are two main definitions of recovery rate.
Let p (t, T ) denote the time-t price of a default-free zero-coupon bond that
pays one dollar at time T where 0 ≤ t ≤ T ≤ T ∗, denote vi (t, T ) the time-t price
of a zero-coupon bond maturing at time T , issued by firm i where i = 1, ..., I .
These corporate bonds are subject to default. If firm i defaults, a unit of its
bond will pay an exogenously specified constant fraction φi ∈ [0, 1) of a dollar
at maturity, therefore the value of the bond after default is φi times the price
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of a default-free bond. This is called the “recovery of treasury” assumption in
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)[47] and Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997)[44].
An alternative to the above definition of recovery rate is the “recovery of
market value” where a fraction of pre-default market value is recovered imme-
diately upon default. With this assumption, only the loss rate can be recovered
from the zero-coupon bond price. Therefore in order to estimate the default in-
tensity and the recovery rate simultaneously, one would have to resort to either
the price of credit derivatives, as suggested by Duffie and Singleton (1999)[26].
Using this recovery assumption, Duffie and Singleton (1999)[26] show that the
defaultable bond price can be expressed as the discounted expected value of a
dollar, where the discount factor is the spot rate plus the loss rate.
3.2.3 Valuation of Defaultable Bonds
Given the setup of default process and recovery rate, we now derive a pricing
formula for defaultable bonds. First, let rt denote the spot rate process adapted
to FXt . The spot rate process could come from any arbitrage-free default-free
term structure model, such as HJM (Heath, Jarrow, and Morton, 1992)[37].
Given P as an equivalent martingale measure, the money market account
and bond price is given by
B (t) = exp
(ˆ t
0
rsds
)
, (3.8)
p (t, T ) = Et
(
B (t)
B (T )
)
, (3.9)
and
V i (t, T ) = Et
(
B (t)
B (T )
(
δi1{τ i≤T} + 1{τ i>T}
))
. (3.10)
where Et (·) is the expectation conditional on time-t information Ft. There-
fore, the defaultable bond price is, as proved in Jarrow and Yu (2001)[48]:
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V i (t, T ) = δip (t, T ) + 1{τ i>T}
(
1− δi)Et [exp(−ˆ T
t
(
rs + λ
i
s
)
ds
)]
, T ≥ t.
(3.11)
Equation (3.11) is intuitive in a way that it states the risky bond’s price can
be divided into two components. The first component is the recovery rate δi
that is received for sure, discounted to time t. The second component is the
residual 1− δi in the event of no default, discounted to time t with an adjusted
spot rate which reflects the default risk. Therefore, pricing under the equivalent
martingale measure depends critically on the evaluation of the expectation in
eq. (3.11).
3.2.4 Contagion Two-firm Model
Given the default process defined above, assuming the existence of a collec-
tion of doubly stochastic Poisson processes, whose intensities satisfy a special
measurablility condition. The bond price of a firm whose default probability is
affected only by macroeconomic conditions and not by the default of other firms
can be calculated using eq.(3.11).
For a firm, B, whose default time distribution is strongly affected by the
default of firm C, the calculation of its bond price entails knowing the distribu-
tion of the default time for C. In return, if C holds a significant amount of debt
issued by B, the distribution of the default time for C would then depend on
that of B. In which case, the relationship described above forms a loop. This
makes it a difficult task in the process of bond price calculation, and then CDS
premium valuation.
In the following, we first introduce the contagion model proposed by Jarrow
& Yu (2001)[48] and illustrate the complexity involved when looping default is
introduced to the model.
Imagine under a CDS contract, party A holds defaultable bonds issued by
party C, (which will be the reference entity in the CDS contract), with the
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concern that C might default before the maturity of the bond T ∗. To hedge
this risk, party A enters into a CDS contract with party B to make a stream of
payments to party B at a fixed rate (also called the “swap rate”) from t=0 to
the maturity of CDS T, (T < T ∗), in exchange for B’s promise to compensate
A for its loss up to a certain amount in the event of C’s default. B’s payment
is contingent on credit events occurring to C, such as missed interest payments
or a credit downgrade or default and is payable at the expiration of the default
swap. Not only can the reference entity default, but the two counterparties, A
and B, can default as well. Thus the pricing of a credit default swap, or the
determination of the swap rate, has to take into account the credit risk from all
three sources.
In our two-firm model, A is assumed to be default-free1, as A’s default before
reference entity C will not generate any loss to counterparty B or C.
If the protection seller B defaults prior to the default of reference entity,
the contract terminates. The protection buyer enters in to a new CDS contract
with another counterparty for the remaining life of the original CDS, the loss
generated due to replacement of CDS contracts is called the replacement cost. If
reference entity C defaulted first, and B failed to deliver the promised payment
to A during the settlement period, then it will have defaulted at the same time
as C or soon afterwards, A will lose the protection promised by B, and will be ex-
posed to a large loss due to B and C’s joint default, this is called settlement risk.
Consider the case where firm B and C hold each other’s debt, so that when
C defaults, B’s default probability will jump, and vice verse. In this two-firm
contagion model, the inter-dependent default risk structure between firm B and
C is characterised by the correlated default intensities:
1Also as concluded in Leung and Kwok (2005)[55], the expression for the swap premium
has little dependence on the default intensity of the protection buyer.
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λBt = b0 + b11{τC≤t},
and λCt = c0 + c11{τB≤t}. (3.12)
Where b0, b1, c0 and c1 are positive constants, therefore, the default intensity
λBt
(
λCt
)
for default time τB
(
τC
)
jumps by the amount b1(c1) when firm C(B)
defaults.
3.2.5 Primary-Secondary Framework
As one can see from equation (3.12) above, these distributions are defined re-
cursively through each other which makes the conditional survival probabilities
Sit (T ) := P
[{
τ i > T | Ft
}]
. i ∈ [B,C] (3.13)
difficult to compute. Therefore (JY) modify their original model by introducing
a primary-secondary framework. In a typical application, if bank B holds a
significant amount of production firm C’s debt, it is unlikely that C is also
holding bank B’s debt or equity, let alone amounts large enough to influence B’s
default probability. Thus (JY) proposed primary firm, whose default process
depends only on a macro variable, whereas secondary firm’s default process
depends on a macro variable and the default process of the primary firm.
Under the CDS contract environment, in which, for example, reference entity
C’s default arrival time is independent of B’s default and has constant intensity
c1 only; on the other side, reference entity C’s default will place an impact on
protection seller B’s default intensity λBt .
λBt = b0 + b11{τC≤t}, (3.14)
and λCt = c0. (3.15)
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This primary-secondary framework makes it easy to construct the doubly
stochastic Poisson (Cox) processes used in Section 3.2.1, it breaks the recursive-
ness in the definition of the default times and thus belong to the class of models
that satisfy the no-jump condition. However, it only works around the problem
by reducing the complexity of the model, and it still encounters tedious inte-
grations as shown in (JY), and in some cases, the counterparty’s default plays
an impact (or indicate an economy-wide turbulence indirectly) back onto the
reference entity, which cannot simply be ignored.
3.2.6 Change of Measure
In order to overcome the recursive default intensity with no loss of generation,
we adopt the change of measure introduced by Collins-Dufresne et al. (2002) in
the valuation procedure of the swap rate, to demonstrate that the conditional
survival probabilities possess simple analytic solutions. We define firm-specific
probability measures Pi |i=B,C by
ZiT ,
dPi
dP
|FT = 1{τ i>T} exp
[ˆ T
0
λisds
]
. (3.16)
and let F i = (F it |i=B,C)t≥0 denote the corresponding enlarged completed fil-
trations to proceed the calculation under measure Pi. One can show that Pi
is absolutely continuous w.r.t. P on the stochastic interval
[
τ i,+∞), it fol-
lows that ZiT is a uniformly integrable P-martingale with respect to F i, and{
τC ≤ T} is a null set of the probability measure PC . This implies that the
intensity of firm B is almost surely constant
(
λBT = b0 + b11{τC≤T} = b0
)
under
probability measure PC . As a result, when computing the survival probability
of firm C conditional on the event
{
τB > T
}
, the potential impact of a jump
in the intensity of firm C on B is effectively ignored. The intuition is that we
are only interested in those paths where firm C does not default, we can ignore
those paths where the intensity of firm B jumps before the survival horizon. An
analogous argument also holds under the measure PB .
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3.3 Continuous-Time Framework
In this section, instead of carrying on using the discrete-time premium rates
from Jarrow & Yu (2001)[48], we extend it to a continuous-time framework. A
much more meaningful result is derived at the end of this chapter.
We denote ECas the expectation taken under the measure PC . For t1 < t2,
the joint distribution for the pair of default times is
P
[
τB > t1, τ
C > t2
]
= E
[
1{τB>t1}1{τC>t2}
]
= EC
[
1{τB>t1} exp
(
−
ˆ t2
0
λCs ds
)]
= EC
[
1{τB>t1} exp
(
−
ˆ t2
0
(
c0 + c11{τB≤s}
)
ds
)]
= e−c0t2EC
[
1{t1<τB<t2} exp
(−c1 (t2 − τB))+ 1{τB>t2}]
= e−c0t2
[ˆ t2
t1
b0e
−b0u−c1(t2−u)du+
ˆ +∞
t2
b0e
−b0udu
]
(3.17)
= b0e
−(c0+c0)t2
[
e(c1−b0)t1 − e(c1−b0)t2
b0 − c1
]
+ e−(b0+c0)t2 .
Equation (3.17) follows from the fact that λBt = b1 for t ≤ t2 under PC
E
[
1{τB>t2}
]
= P
[
τB > t2
]
= EC
[
exp
(
−
ˆ t2
0
λBs ds
)]
(3.18)
= EC
[
exp
(
−
ˆ t2
0
b0ds
)]
= e−b0t2 =
ˆ +∞
t2
b0e
−b0udu = EC
[
1{τB>t2}
]
.
Similarly, for t2 ≤ t1, the joint distribution of default times is given by
P
[
τB > t1, τ
C > t2
]
= c0e
−(b0+b1)t1
[
e(b1−c0)t2 − e(b1−c0)t1
c0 − b1
]
+ e−(b0+c0)t1 .
(3.19)
Therefore, by setting t2 = 0 (when t2 < t1) and t1 = 0 (when t1 < t2)
respectfully, the marginal survival probabilities are obtained:
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P[τB > t1] =
c0e
−(b0+b1)t1 − b1e−(b0+c0)t1
c0 − b1 , t1 ≤ T, (3.20)
P[τC > t2] =
b0e
−(c0+c1)t2 − c1e−(b0+c0)t2
b0 − c1 . t2 ≤ T. (3.21)
Differentiating the joint default probability with respect to t1 and t2 gives
f (t1, t2) =
∂2P
[
τB > t1, τ
C > t2
]
∂t1∂t2
=

c0(b0 + b1)e
−(b0+b1)t1−(c0−b1)t2 , t2 ≤ t1,
b0(c0 + c1)e
−(c0+c1)t2−(b0−c1)t1 . t2 > t1.
(3.22)
Differentiating the marginal survival probabilities gives the marginal density
of the default times τBand τC :
f (t1) =
dP[τB > t1]
dt1
=
(b0 + c0)b1e
−(b0+c0)t1 − (b0 + b1)c0e−(b0+b1)t1
c0 − b1 , (3.23)
and
f(t2) =
dP[τC > t2]
dt2
=
(b0 + c0)c1e
−(b0+c0)t2 − (c0 + c1)b0e−(c0+c1)t1
b0 − c1 . (3.24)
3.4 Pricing Credit Derivatives Swaps
To simplify our CDS valuation, without loss of generality, we assume a flat
term structure of risk-free rate r2, and furthermore, a zero recovery rate with
the notional of $1. We modified the model introduced by Jarrow & Yu and
relaxed the assumption that each party is obligated to pay until its own default,
regardless of whether the other party has defaulted or not.
2Without loss of analytical tractability, JY’s framework can be extended to stochastic
interest rate within the class of affine structure.
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The market value of A’s fixed rate premium leg at time 0 is
E
[ˆ T
0
exp
(
−
ˆ s
0
rudu
)
p1{τB∧τC>s}ds
]
. (3.25)
in which p is the swap premium rate fixed at the beginning of the contract.
Given either B or C’s default at certain point, party A is still obligated to pay
off the residual amount that accumulates from the last payment date till the
default date (when the contract terminates) in proportion. Using the continuous
premium rate other than its discrete counterpart simplifies this process caused
between quarterly payment dates.
The time-0 market value of B’s promised payment (protection leg) in the
event of C’s default is
E
[
1{τC≤T} exp
(
−
ˆ τC+δ
0
rudu
)
1{τB>τC+δ}
]
. (3.26)
in which δ is the length of the settlement period, hence τC + δ represents the
settlement date at the end of the settlement period.
Since it takes no cost to enter a CDS contract at the deal date, by equating
the premium leg and protection leg, as in equation (3.25) and (3.26), we get the
swap premium:
p =
E
[
1{τC≤T} exp
(
− ´ τC+δ
0
rudu
)
1{τB>τC+δ}
]
E
[´ T
0
exp
(− ´ s
0
rudu
)
1{τB∧τC>s}ds
] . (3.27)
The buyer may face potential replacement cost when party B defaults prior
to the reference asset C, τB < min
(
τC , T
)
, however, since p represents the fair
premium charged by the protection seller B, the replacement cost should not be
included in the calculation of the swap premium.
To simplify the calculation, and without loss of generality a flat risk-free rate
r is applied, with zero recovery and a notional of $1.
By applying the result of eq. (3.19) and setting t1 = t2 = s, the premium
leg is found to be:
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P
[
τB > s, τC > s
]
= E
[
1{τB>s}1{τC>s}
]
= e−(b0+c0)s = E
[
1{τB>s}
]
E
[
1{τC>s}
]
.
(3.28)
which means if party B and C default at the same time, then there will be no
jump parameter (b1 and c1) involved, and the intensity rates are almost surely
constant (b0 and c0) under this special case, given the unique nature of (JY)
model.
Therefore,
E
[ˆ T
0
e−rsp1{τB∧τC>s}ds
]
= p
ˆ T
0
E
[
e−rs1{τB∧τC>s}
]
ds
= p
ˆ T
0
E
[
e−rs1{τB>s}1{τC>s}
]
ds
= p
ˆ T
0
[
e−(b0+c0+r)s
]
ds
= p · 1− e
−(b0+c0+r)T
b0 + c0 + r
. (3.29)
The default leg is found out to be, using the same change of measure intro-
duced above:
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E
[
1{τC≤T}e
−r(τC+δ)1{τB>τC+δ}
]
= EB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−r(τC+δ) exp
(
−
ˆ τC+δ
0
(
b0 + b11{τC≤u}
)
du
)]
= EB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−(r+b0)(τC+δ) exp
(−b11{τC≤τC+δ} (τC + δ − τC))]
= EB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−(r+b0)(τC+δ) exp (−b1δ)
]
= e−(r+b0+b1)δEB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−(r+b0)τC
]
= e−(r+b0+b1)δ
ˆ T
0
c0e
−(b0+c0+r)sds
=
e−(r+b0+b1)δc0
[
1− e−(b0+c0+r)T ]
b0 + c0 + r
. (3.30)
Setting eq. (3.29) equal to eq. (3.30) gives the premium rate
p = e−(r+b0+b1)δc0. (3.31)
3.5 Interpretation of the Results
The result we obtained in eq.(3.31) is an interesting one, imagine the settlement
period equals to 0, which means party B and C default at the same time, the
premium rate depends only on the intensity rate c0. In general, the jump
factor based on party B’s default (c1) disappears in the calculation, whereas the
default intensity factor b0 and b1 (based on C’s default) both matter in the swap
premium derivation. However, one cannot tell whether the default intensity of
party B (τB) comes from the constant b0 only or the combination of b0 and b1,
however, the higher the default intensity of B itself (b0), the lower the premium,
and given b0 fixed, the higher the b1, the lower the premium rate.
Figure (3.1) below shows the premium rate based on eq. (3.31), by varying
the settlement period and the counterparty B’s total intensity (b0 + b1) . Setting
r = 0.05, c0 = 0.1, and settlement period δ varies from 0 to 1 year, and the total
intensity rate of B (b0 + b1) varies from 0 to 1. As one can observe in the figure,
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Figure 3.1: Effect of settlement period and intensity rates on swap premium
Setting r = 0.05,c0 = 0.1, and settlement period δvaries from 0 to 1 year, and
the total intensity rate of B (b0 + b1) varies from 0 to 1. As one can observe
once the intensity of party B goes higher, the premium rate drops exponentially
with the increase of settlement date.
if the settlement period for B is short, the premium stays relatively close to C’s
default intensity c0, the total intensity of B does not have a big impact, however,
if the settlement period is longer, the premium rate drops exponentially with
the increase of total intensity. And vice versa, if the total intensity for B is low,
the premium stays relatively close to C’s default intensity c0, the settlement
period can be ignored. However, if the total intensity of party B goes higher,
the premium rate drops exponentially with the length of the settlement period.
This result makes practical sense, as if a protection buyer A gets into a CDS
contract with a counterparty that has a poor credit rating instead of one with a
good rating, on the same reference entity, A would expect to pay less premium,
as there is a higher chance that the protection seller B goes bust either before the
reference entity C defaults or within the settlement period once C defaults, which
leaves A end up paying all the premium over the years and not being covered for
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the potential default of C. Notice here b1 represents the correlation between the
reference entity C and the counterparty B. This means if two different protection
sellers are similar rated (same default intensity b0), a higher correlation between
the reference entity and protection seller (b1) indicates a higher chance for B to
default together with C, therefore, a lower premium rate.
Given the same default intensity of the counterparty and reference entity, if
it takes longer settlement period for the protection seller to pay back the loss
agreed in the contract, it indicates that the counterparty is having a problem
re-financing the payment, or in other words, is more likely to default due to
the loss caused by the default of the reference entity, and hence lower the swap
premium.
Notice here c1, the jump on C’s intensity rate due to B’s default, disappears
out of the equation due to the change of measure. This shows that once the
counterparty default, it will not influence the credit rating of the underlying.
This is similar to the case when an option seller defaults, it does not matter for
the company issuing the underlying stock, as there is no direct loss in terms of
contractual payment, the contract terminates automatically with no transaction
needed. Whereas if the reference entity defaults, counterparty B is obliged a
large contractual amount of the underlying notional to A, and it matters to B’s
credibility how fast it can gather the contractual amount internally to repay A
due to C’s default. Another way to explain why b1 plays an important role here.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter extends the contagion model originally introduced by Jarrow &
Yu (2001)[48] by applying the change of measure technique derived by Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2002)[11] for pricing defaultable securities. This solves the
problem of violation of jump conditions under Cox processes for defaultable
credit derivatives, instead of assuming a primary-secondary framework to over-
come the tedious integrations. The author found a more simple and meaningful
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result to the swap premium calculation by introducing continuous swap pre-
mium rate instead of discrete premium payment (commonly found in market
practice) without loss of generality. We found that given a fixed settlement pe-
riod after the reference entity’s default, a higher default intensity of protection
seller leads to a lower swap premium. On the other hand, by fixing the inten-
sity rate constant, a longer the settlement period indicates a more likely event
that the counterparty defaults within the settlement period, this also means
a protection buyer would like to pay less for protection against the default of
reference entity.
Chapter 4
Three-firm Model
Notation of Variables
λAt default intensity of protection buyer
λBt default intensity of protection seller
λCt default intensity of reference entity
a0, b0, and c0 default intensity of firm A, B, and C without the jump intensities
a1, a2 jump intensity on A when B, or C defaults
b1, b2 jump intensity on B when A, or C defaults
c1, c2 jump intensity on C when A, or B defaults
f (u1, u2) joint density of
(
τA, τB
)
p swap premium
P
[
τA > t1, τ
B > t2, τ
C > t3
]
joint survival probability
f (t1, t2, t3) joint density function
v the time variant component on top of constant intensities
h the volume of the flow
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In order to study the effect of correlated default times among all parties in
a CDS on the swap premium, this chapter extends the contagion counterparty
risk model to a three-firm model. This means the protection buyer, party A, is
defaultable as well as the protection seller B and reference entity C. We found
that protection seller A’s possibility to default does not play an as important
role as counterparty B and reference entity C’s default, in fact, some of the
parameters linking A’s default impact to B or C disappear during the derivation
to the swap rate, and by assuming B’s jump intensity due to A’s default to be
relatively small, we get the same results as the two-firm model.
Finally, in order to relax some of the assumptions of the contagion framework
to make the findings more general, we make the intensity rates time-variant by
experiencing an economy upturn and downturn every decade, and demonstrated
in a two-firm defaultable environment, and find that the general findings still
hold. In fact if the settlement period is small enough, we find that the swap
premium is equal to the one in the constant intensity case.
4.1 Joint Default Probability
The default risk structure is specified by the inter-dependent default intensities:
λAt = a0 + a11{τB≤t} + a21{τC≤t}, (4.1)
λBt = b0 + b11{τA≤t} + b21{τC≤t}, (4.2)
λCt = c0 + c11{τA≤t} + c21{τB≤t}. (4.3)
The setting above shows that the default probability of each party in the
CDS contract depends on the default status of other firms. It can be reduced
to the two-firm model mentioned above by setting a0 = a1 = a2 = 0. If we take
c1 = c2 = 0, the default intensities of both the counterparties in the CDS do
not affect the credit rating of the reference entity. This case can be financially
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interpreted as the reference asset, say a risky bond, is issued by a large firm C
whose default has an economy-wide impact. A small firm A holds this bond and
wants to be protected from the credit risk upon C’s default, therefore A enters
into a CDS with protection seller B, who has correlated default risk with A upon
each other’s default as well as A’s default. Similarly, if we take b1 = b2 = 0,
we can interpret party B as a large financial institution that has an economy-
wide impact on default. Therefore, reference entity C and protection buyer A’s
default intensity will jump upon B’s default.
Given the setting above for three defaultable parties in the CDS contract,
one can derive the joint distribution of the three default times. For t1 < t2 < t3:
P
[
τA > t1, τ
B > t2, τ
C > t3
]
= E
[
1{τA>t1}1{τB>t2}1{τC>t3}
]
= EC
[
1{τA>t1}1{τB>t2} exp
(
−
ˆ t3
0
λCs ds
)]
= EC
[
1{τA>t1}1{τB>t2} exp
(
−
ˆ t3
0
(
c0 + c11{τA≤t} + c21{τB≤t}
)
ds
)]
(4.4)
= e−c0t3EC
[
1{τA>t1}1{τB>t2} exp
(− (t3 − τA) c11{τA≤t3} − (t3 − τB) c21{τB≤t3})] .
Note that
1{τA>t1}1{τB>t2}
= 1{t1<τA≤t2}1{t2<τB≤t3} + 1{t2<τA≤t3}1{t2<τB≤t3} + 1{τA>t3}1{t2<τB≤t3}
+ 1{t1<τA≤t2}1{τB>t3} + 1{t2<τA≤t3}1{τB>t3} + 1{τA>t3}1{τB>t3}. (4.5)
Therefore, we could derive:
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P
[
τA > t1, τ
B > t2, τ
C > t3
]
= e−(c0+c1+c2)t3EC
[
1{t1<τA≤t2}1{t2<τB≤t3}e
c1τ
A+c2τ
B
]
+ e−(c0+c1+c2)t3EC
[
1{t2<τA≤t3}1{t2<τB≤t3}e
c1τ
A+c2τ
B
]
+ e−(c0+c1+c2)t3EC
[
1{τA>t3}1{t2<τB≤t3}e
c2τ
B
]
+ e−(c0+c1+c2)t3EC
[
1{t1<τA≤t2}1{τB>t3}e
c1τ
A
]
+ e−(c0+c1+c2)t3EC
[
1{t2<τA≤t3}1{τB>t3}e
c1τ
A
]
+ e−(c0+c1+c2)t3EC
[
1{τA>t3}1{τB>t3}
]
. (4.6)
Under the measure PC and for t < t3, the default intensities λAt and λBt are
given by
λAt = a0 + a11{τB≤t}, (4.7)
λCt = c0 + c21{τB≤t}. (4.8)
Using the joint density of
(
τA, τB
)
f (u1, u2) = a0 (b0 + b1) e
−(b0+b1)u2−(a0−b1)u1 , u1 < u2. (4.9)
one can compute EC
[
1{t1<τA≤t2}1{τB>t3}e
c1τ
A
]
and other similar terms.
Once we have obtained P
[
τA > t1, τ
B > t2, τ
C > t3
]
, we differentiate the
distribution function w.r.t. t1, t2 and t3 to give the joint density function
f (t1, t2, t3) = a0 (b0 + b1) (c0 + c1 + c2) e
−(a0−b1−c1)t1−(b0+b1−c2)t2−(c0+c1+c2)t3
for t1 < t2 < t3. (4.10)
The rest sequence of t1,t2 and t3 can be obtained similarly as:
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f (t1, t2, t3) =

a0 (b0 + b1) (c0 + c1 + c2)
×e−(a0−b1−c1)t1−(b0+b1−c2)t2−(c0+c1+c2)t3 , t1 < t2 < t3,
a0 (c0 + c1) (b0 + b1 + b2)
×e−(a0−b1−c1)t1−(b0+b1+b2)t2−(c0+c1−b2)t3 , t1 < t3 < t2,
b0 (a0 + a1) (c0 + c1 + c2)
×e−(a0+a1−c1)t1−(b0−a1−c2)t2−(c0+c1+c2)t3 , t2 < t1 < t3,
b0 (c0 + c2) (a0 + a1 + a2)
×e−(a0+a1+a2)t1−(b0−a1−c2)t2−(c0+c2−a2)t3 , t2 < t3 < t1,
c0 (a0 + a2) (b0 + b1 + b2)
×e−(a0+a2−b1)t1−(b0+b1+b2)t2−(c0−a2−b2)t3 , t3 < t1 < t2,
c0 (b0 + b2) (a0 + a1 + a2)
×e−(a0+a1+a2)t1−(b0+b2−a1)t2−(c0−a2−b2)t3 , t3 < t2 < t1.
(4.11)
4.2 Swap Premium
Similar to the swap premium rate calculation in section 3.4, we assume a flat
term structure of risk-free rate r, and a zero recovery rate with the notional of
$1. The market value of A’s fixed rate premium leg at time 0 is
E
[ˆ T
0
exp
(
−
ˆ s
0
rudu
)
p1{τA∧τB∧τC>s}ds
]
(4.12)
in which p is the swap premium rate fixed at the beginning of the contract.
Here the contract terminates if any of the counterparties or the reference entity
default before the maturity. Again, we favour using the continuous function
other than discrete type, so we do not need to worry about the premium payment
between the recent premium payment date (usually quarterly) and default date.
The time-0 market value of B’s promised payment (protection leg) in the
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event of C’s default is
E
[
1{τC≤T} exp
(
−
ˆ τC+δ
0
rudu
)
1{τA>τC}1{τB>τC+δ}
]
(4.13)
in which δ is the length of the settlement period, hence τC + δ represents
the settlement date at the end of the settlement period. One more condition is
added compared to the two-firm case, that protection buyer A does not default
before the reference entity. Same conditions applies for protection seller B that
will survive until the contract default payment is cleared off.
Since it takes no cost to enter a CDS contract at the deal date, by equalling
the premium leg and protection leg, as in equation (4.12) and (4.13), we get the
swap premium:
p =
E
[
1{τC≤T} exp
(
− ´ τC+δ
0
rudu
)
1{τA>τC}1{τB>τC+δ}
]
E
[´ T
0
exp
(− ´ s
0
rudu
)
1{τA∧τB∧τC>s}ds
] (4.14)
Again we assume constant risk-free rate r and zero recovery on a notional
of $1.
Using the joint density function f (t1, t2, t3) for t3 < t1 < t2, we obtain the
default leg:
E
[
1{τC≤T} exp
(
−
ˆ τC+δ
0
rudu
)
1{τA>τC}1{τB>τC+δ}
]
=
ˆ T
0
ˆ ∞
τC+δ
ˆ ∞
τC
e−r(τ
C+δ)f
(
τA, τB , τC
)
dτAdτBdτC |t3<t1<t2
= c0 (a0 + a2) (b0 + b1 + b2)
ˆ T
0
ˆ ∞
τC+δ
ˆ ∞
τC
e−r(τ
C+δ)
× exp (−(a0 + a2 − b1)τA − (b0 + b1 + b2) τB − (c0 − a2 − b2) τC) dτAdτBdτC
=
c0 (a0 + a2) e
−(b0+b1+b2+r)δ
a0 + a2 − b1 ·
1− e−(a0+b0+c0+r)T
a0 + b0 + c0 + r
. (4.15)
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The premium leg can be handled in a similar fashion as that in the two-firm
model:
E
[ˆ T
0
exp
(
−
ˆ s
0
rudu
)
p1{τA∧τB∧τC>s}ds
]
= p
ˆ T
0
E
[
e−rs1{τA>s}1{τB>s}1{τC>s}
]
ds
= p
ˆ T
0
e−rsEA
[
1{τB>s}1{τC>s} exp
(
−
ˆ T
0
(
a0 + a11{τB≤s} + a21{τC≤s}
)
ds
)]
= p
ˆ T
0
e−(a0+r)TEA
[
1{τB>s}1{τC>s}
]
ds
= p
ˆ T
0
e−(a0+r)T e−(b0+c0)T
= p
1− e−(a0+b0+c0+r)T
a0 + b0 + c0 + r
. (4.16)
using equation (4.2), the premium rate is easily derived:
p =
E
[
1{τC≤T} exp
(
− ´ τC+δ
0
rudu
)
1{τA>τC}1{τB>τC+δ}
]
E
[´ T
0
exp
(− ´ s
0
rudu
)
1{τA∧τB∧τC>s}ds
] = c0 (a0 + a2) e−(b0+b1+b2+r)δ
a0 + a2 − b1 .
(4.17)
4.3 Interpretation of Three-firm Model Premium
Similar to the results of the two-firm model in eq.(3.31), in the premium for
three-firm model in eq.(4.17), the correlation parameter due to the protection
seller B’s default on C (c2) does not count as part of the premium calculation,
as a matter of fact, B’s default impact for A does not matter either as a1 goes
out of the picture as well. In reality, once B defaults as a protection seller,
neither C or A should be influenced unless they are holding a large amount of
debt or defaultable bond from B, as there are no contractual payments in the
CDS contract once B defaults. The only possible loss is the replacement cost
for A. In order to protect itself from underlying C’s default, A needs to go to
the market to enter a new CDS contract. The loss generated from the difference
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of the old and new premium rates (if the mark-to-market CDS price is higher)
will be the replacement cost to A.
Similar case for A, as no contractual payments are generated either by B
or C once A defaults. Note the impact of A’s default on reference entity C,
namely c1, went out of the equation; and furthermore, by setting b1, which is
represented as the impact of A’s default on protection seller B, equal to zero, the
premium for the three firm model equals to c0e−(b0+b2+r)δ, which is the same
premium rate for the two-firm model, as stated in eq. (3.31). Which means
the default of counterparty B and protection buyer A do not play a big role on
the swap premium, even given that A’s defaultable. This is further supported
by the discovery that both c1 and c2 disappeared, which leaves only the default
intensity of C before either A or B’s default (c0), to be essential for the swap
premium.
Now let us have a look at the jump parameters for B’s intensity rate, which
represents the counterparty risk, the main topic of this thesis. Both b1 and b2
stay in the premium calculation, although given b1 relatively small, the premium
rates gets close to the one in the two-firm case. Again, we cannot tell apart b0
from b2, as given all the other parameters fixed, a lower premium rate can be
generated from either a higher b0, or a higher combination of b0 and b2.
By setting the default intensity of the protection seller a0, protection buyer
b0 and reference entity c0 all equal to 0.05, interest rate r = 0.05, length of set-
tlement period δ = 0.25, and intensity parameters due to other parties’ default:
b1 = 0.02, b2 = 0.02, a2 = 0.02, the swap premium is p = 0.0676. Figure 4.1 be-
low shows the dynamic of CDS premium by varying each individual parameter
given others fixed.
As we can see from the graph c0, a0, and a2 are more influential as a driving
factor than that of b0, b1, and b2, it is obvious that c0 as the default intensity of
reference entity itself plays an important role due to its direct relationship with
the default probability of C. If the default intensity of reference entity is high,
CHAPTER 4. THREE-FIRM MODEL 70
Figure 4.1: CDS premium changes by varying each individual parameter
in eq. (4.17), by setting c0 = 0.05, r = 0.05, δ = 0.25, b0 = 0.05, b1 = 0.02,
b2 = 0.02, a0 = 0.05, a2 = 0.02, the swap premium p = 0.0676.
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then the protection seller B should charge A for large premium. The reason
why a0 and a2 produce such a steep slope is that, given b1 is relatively small,
a0+a2
a0+a2−b1 increases more dramatically than that of b0, b1, and b2 in a exponential
speed. In reality, b1 as the jump factor on B conditional on A’s default, should
be relatively small. This is because in the CDS contract, only B is potentially
obliged to pay A a notional amount, not the other way round, so theoretically
A’s default should not disturb B’s credit quality.
The other factors are in line with practical sense, if the risk-free rate goes up,
that means the future payments are further discounted back to today, hence, a
smaller premium. The longer the settlement period, the more likely B will be
facing financial trouble to fullfill the contract requirement once C defaults, and
the lower the premium. The higher the combination of b0, b1, and b2, the more
likely the counterparty B is going to default due to either the credit quality of
its own, or external influence caused by either A or B’s default, note the curves
for them should be exponentially shaped, although the graph does not show
significantly due to the small quantity of the intensity rates.
4.4 Time Variant Intensity Rate
To extend the model even further and relax the constant intensity rate assump-
tion. We assume the intensity rate is time variant and following a flow as follows:
This could be interpreted as the upturn and downturn of the status of econ-
omy.
Applying the results on the two-firm model, we get the framework as:
λBt = b0 + v + b11{τC≤t} (4.18)
λCt = c0 + v + c11{τB≤t}. (4.19)
in which v represents the time variant component, if set v equals sin(2t/pi)h , h
CHAPTER 4. THREE-FIRM MODEL 72
Figure 4.2: Time variant jump on intensity rate
Define default intensity λBt = b0 + v + b11{τC≤t} in which V =
sin(2t/pi)
h . By
setting b0 = 0.05, b1 = 0.15 and h = 100, we obtain the process of λBt as above,
this is to represent the economic cycle every 10 years.
defines the volume of the flow, the smaller the h, the more volatile the wave and
vice versa. For example, by setting b0 = 0.05, b1 = 0.15 and h = 100, and we
assume the business cycle experiences an upturn and downturn every decade,
we have a plot as shown in figure (4.2). Say the reference entity defaults at
the end of 6 year, which generates a jump in the counterparty intensity rate,
therefore the grey line after 6 years shows the process of the intensity when no
default happens, the light blue curve after 6 years shows the process once the
reference entity defaults, which is shifted by 1.5 percent above the grey line.
Therefore taking the two-firm model, for t1 < t2, the joint default probability
is:
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P
[
τB > t1, τ
C > t2
]
= E
[
1{τB>t1}1{τC>t2}
]
= EC
[
1{τB>t1} exp
(
−
ˆ t2
0
(
c0 + v + c11{τB≤s}
)
ds
)]
= e−c0t2+kEC
[
1{t1<τB<t2} exp
(−c1 (t2 − τB))+ 1{τB>t2}]
= e−c0t2+k
[ˆ t2
t1
b0e
−b0u−c1(t2−u)du+
ˆ +∞
t2
b0e
−b0udu
]
= b0e
−(c0+c0)t2+k
[
e(c1−b0)t1 − e(c1−b0)t2
b0 − c1
]
+ e−(b0+c0)t2+k. (4.20)
in which
k = −
ˆ t2
0
sin (2t/pi)
h
ds =
pi
2h
[
cos
(
2t2
pi
)
− 1
]
.
Similarly, for t2 ≤ t1, the joint distribution of default times is given by
P
[
τB > t1, τ
C > t2
]
= c0e
−(b0+b1)t1+k
[
e(b1−c0)t2 − e(b1−c0)t1
c0 − b1
]
+ e−(b0+c0)t1+k.
(4.21)
By applying the result of eq. (3.19) and setting t1 = t2 = s, the premium
leg is found to be:
P
[
τB > s, τC > s
]
= E
[
1{τB>s}1{τC>s}
]
= e−(b0+c0)s+k. (4.22)
Therefore, following eq.(3.27), we can derive the premium leg as:
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E
[ˆ T
0
e−rsp1{τB∧τC>s}ds
]
= p
ˆ T
0
E
[
e−rs1{τB∧τC>s}
]
ds
= p
ˆ T
0
E
[
e−rs1{τB>s}1{τC>s}
]
ds
= p
ˆ T
0
[
e−(b0+c0+r)s+k
]
ds. (4.23)
The default leg is found out to be, using the same change of measure intro-
duced above:
E
[
1{τC≤T}e
−r(τC+δ)1{τB>τC+δ}
]
= EB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−r(τC+δ) exp
(
−
ˆ τC+δ
0
(
b0 + v + b11{τC≤u}
)
du
)]
= EB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−(r+b0)(τC+δ)+k′ exp
(−b11{τC≤τC+δ} (τC + δ − τC))]
= EB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−(r+b0)(τC+δ)+k′ exp (−b1δ)
]
= e−(r+b0+b1)δEB
[
1{τC≤T}e
−(r+b0)τC+k′
]
= e−(r+b0+b1)δ
ˆ T
0
c0e
−(b0+c0+r)τC+k′dτC (4.24)
in which
k
′
= −
ˆ τC+δ
0
sin (2t/pi)
h
ds =
pi
2h
[
cos
(
2
(
τC + δ
)
pi
)
− 1
]
.
As the k and k′ in eq. (4.23) and (4.24) both have time variables inside,
therefore it is difficult to analytically integrate the last equations in both the
fee leg and pay leg, to simplify the equation, we could assume the settlement
period δ to be relatively small, therefore k = k′, and we get the same result as
the constant intensity rate for the two-firm model:
p = e−(r+b0+b1)δc0. (4.25)
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Alternatively, numerical integration can be applied, or Monte-Carlo simula-
tion based on the process of the intensity rate.
4.5 Conclusion
To summarise, this chapter extends the two-firm model of the previous chapter
by assuming the defaultability of the protection buyer A. We find that making
A defaultable does not make a big difference in terms of the swap premium
calculation. A’s default only has a small impact on B’s default, and none of A
or B’s default changes the underlying reference entity C’s default intensity. If
b1, B’s intensity jump volumn due to A’s default is small enough, we get the
same result as in the two-firm model. The settlement period and counterparty
B’s total intensity rate still play a crucial role in the swap premium calculation,
this is in line with the results from the two-firm model: a longer settlement
period increases the counterparty B’s intensity rate, and lower the continuous
premium rate protection buyer A would like to pay.
To make the results more general, we also relax the assumptions by extending
the intensity rate from constant to time-variant. We design the default intensity
of a wave shape with an upturn and downturn every 10 years to represent the
macro economy circle. We find that the premium rate shows similar results to
the constant intensity rate case. If settlement period is short enough, the time-
variant intensity generates the same results to the premium rate with constant
intensity. By making the protection buyer defaultable and default intensity
time-variant, we obtain some generalised results with a more practical setup,
whereas at the same time, conclude some meaningful and close results to the
one from Chapter 3.
Chapter 5
Cox–Ingersoll–Ross Model
In this chapter we carry out an empirical Study on Counterparty Risk within
CDS spread, using the default spread information extracted from corporate bond
data and credit swap premia to provide direct measures on the size of default
and non-default components in corporate yield spreads. To explain counterparty
risk, a proxy is introduced to represent the average counterparty spread across
the financial industry, by taking the difference between 5-year credit spread
over benchmark rate, and 5-year credit spread over swap rate. We compare
our results to Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] and argue that government bonds
remain a good candidate for risk-free rates, the reason swap rate outperforms
government bond rate in Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] is because counterparty risk
is not properly adapted into the credit spread calculation.
In this chapter we challenge the results of Houweling and Vorst (2005)[39]
and many other papers’ conclusion that swap and repo curves outperform the
government curve as default-free interest rates. We find that counterparty risk
is ignored in most of the studies on default risk study in CDS pricing, where the
difference between the swap yield and the government curve can be employed
as a good candidate for counterparty premium in CDS pricing. The results
of Houweling and Vorst (2005)[39] are relatively insensitive to the value of the
assumed recovery rate, which agrees with our findings.
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5.1 Pricing Default Swaps
Several features of the default swaps are worth mentioning. If the contract is
based on periodic payments, and default occurs, the buyer is required to pay
fraction of the premium payment up to date since the last payment, this is
called the accrual payment. The credit event may apply to a single reference
obligation, but more commonly the events can refer to a much broader class of
debt securities, including bonds and loans.
Counterparty risk is generally not taken into account in determining deal
prices; if a party is unwilling to take on credit risk to its counterparty, i.e.
protection seller in the default swap, it can either cancel the trade or alleviate
the exposure, e.g. by demanding a collateral provided from the counterparty,
or that the premium is paid up-front instead of periodically.
An important application of default swaps is shorting credit risk. The lack
of a market for repurchase agreements (repos) for most corporates makes short-
ing bonds unfeasible. Therefore, credit derivatives take on the role to short
corporate credit risk in a viable way. Even if a bond can be shorted in the repo
market, investors can only do so for a relative short period of time, exposing
them to changes in the repo rate. On the other hand, default swaps allow in-
vestors to go short credit risk at a known cost for longer time spans from 1 year
up to 10 years, liquidity rapidly decrease for even longer terms. Typically 5
year credit default swaps are most highly traded credit derivatives, hence least
liquidity risk.
O’Kane and McAdie (2001)[64] mention Counterparty Risk and its potential
impact in their paper with a comprehensive look at the differences between the
cash swap and default swap market. The aim is to explore the differences
between the cash and default swap markets for a given credit name and develop
a framework to look at these differences.
Several fundamental factors due to the differences between the natures of
the contracts cause the spreads of cash swap and default swap to differ. Fun-
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damental reasons such as the delivery option, risk of technical default, coupon
step-ups in the bond, P&L realisation, default swap spreads must be positive
and assets trading below par, will increase the default swap basis, whereas fac-
tors such as funding, off balance sheet, leverage, accrued interest, counterparty
risk and assets trading above par will cause the default swap basis to decrease.
DefaultSwapBasis = DefaultSwapSpread –ParFloaterSpread (5.1)
A cash bond is a straightforward transaction between an issuer and a bond-
holder involving no other credit risk, whereas a default swap is a bilateral over-
the-counter derivative transaction which is entered into with a counterparty,
protection buyer and seller in this case. This adds the new dimension of coun-
terparty risk to the default swap. The protection buyer will therefore have the
tendency to pay a lower spread as compensation against the risk of counterparty
- protection seller default, which reduces the default swap basis.
For the protection seller, the exposure is to a loss of mark-to-market caused
by a narrowing of spread, due to protection buyer’s default. The size of the loss
depends on the level of the spreads at the initial stage of the contract;
For the protection buyer, the risk is when counterparty is unable to make the
payment on the default of underlying reference entity. For a physically settled
default swap this corresponds to a payment of par when the default asset is
delivered. The protection buyer’s exposure can therefore be considerable. Due
to the fact that it is an exposure contingent on default, it is highly dependent
upon the degree of default correlation between the reference entity and the
counterparty. A high default correlation means that it is likely for the default of
reference entity to be associated with default of the counterparty, and vice-versa.
For example, buying protection on a German company from a German bank
may be considered as a highly correlated trade in which the protection buyer
should consider the likelihood that the German bank may be unable to compen-
sate the buyer for the loss generated due to the default of the German company.
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The protection buyer will be more willing to pay for this “protection” to a less
correlated bank with the German company.
At trade level, the market does not generally price the counterparty risk
into default swap spread. The counterparty risk is alleviated in the case that
a) either counterparty in the swap contract decides that it is not willing to take
on the counterparty risk of another - therefore the trade does not occur; or b)
some other means such as dynamic collateral posting agreement is reached.
At market level, counterparty risk is mostly a concern to protection buyers,
who have the tendency short the cash bond, although it is unrealistic to short
corporate and emerging market sovereign bonds. Counterparty risk is a concern
at trade level, it does not play a significant role at a market level. Its effect
could cause default swap spreads to narrow as protection buyers require a com-
pensation for their counterparty exposure, or rather pay a higher premium to a
higher-rated counterparty.
5.2 Model measuring the default component
In this section, the CIR framework is used to measure the size of the default
component in corporate yield spreads. The definition of corporate bond yield
spreads is the yield on a corporate bond over the yield on a riskless bond with
identical coupon rate and maturity date. This means the yields on risky and
riskless bonds with identical promised cashflows are obtained for comparison.
In the sections below, we follow industry practice of assuming that the credit
default swaps premium equals to the default component for the firms’ bonds.
We hence compare the default swap premium for a 5-year contract directly
with the corporate spread for a 5-year bond. This approach provides a simple
model-independent measure of the percentage size of the default component.
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5.3 The Data
The choice of default-free interest rate has been debatable over recent years,
interest rate swap curves such as LIBOR/EURIBOR has become favoured by
practitioners over the years above the treasury curve/ government bond ap-
proach. Some argue that it has a relatively greater supply to the market, this
provides a better liquidity than government bond, which has a limited amount
of supply to the market. However, LIBOR (London Inter-bank Borrow Rate),
has become questionable for its credit quality, especially over the crisis period,
market participants realise there is a chance that bank who lends the money can
default, counterparty risk cannot be ignored, especially in interest rate swaps
or credit default swaps deals.
Many papers, such as Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] study credit risk over
instruments such as interest rate swaps or credit default swaps, and they find
that using the repo curve or the swap curve provides a better fit as a risk-
free benchmark than treasury curves, however, they also ignore the impact of
counterparty risk, i.e. insurance company, investment banks, or even hedge
funds, whose own default risk is at risk. The reason swap rates, or say, LIBOR
curve provides a good fit on CDS spreads fitting models, is that they ignore the
underlying counterparty default risk, which is embedded in both LIBOR rates
and CDS prices.
In this thesis we believe that the old-fashioned government bond curve is
still the best proxy for risk-free rate, despite its liquidity disadvantage to swap
curve, which is relatively a small difference. In the corporate bonds data we later
explain in detail, we look for both bond yield over benchmark government bond
rate and bond yield over the swap rate. We then take the difference between
the two yields and use the difference as the proxy for average counterparty
proxy across the market. We then add the difference due to counterparty risk
over government bonds onto CDS data from the market, whose issuers are also
issuers of the interest rate swaps, which makes the new adjusted CDS spreads
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counterparty-risk-free. We could then apply CIR model and calibrate the default
intensity component, which only represents the default risk of the underlying
reference entity.
On the data collected from the corporate bond market, we carry on using
the spreads over benchmark curves to represent the default component of the
underlying reference entity, this is blended with the liquidity risk factor of the
corporate bond on top, and then calibrate a total intensity to represent the sum
of default component of the entity and liquidity factor of the bracketing bonds.
The difference between the default intensity from the adjusted CDS spread and
the intensity from the bond market is then chosen into account to represent
liquidity risk.
We assume there is no liquidity risk in the CDS spreads, as we pick up the
5-year CDS data which is recognised to be the most liquid out of all the CDS
spreads for the same underlyings, and we only pick up the major underlyings
that show up frequently within the iTraxx series 1-11.1 Another important
reason is that the contractual nature of credit default swaps, rather than be-
ing a security, this makes them far less sensitive to liquidity risk (also called
convenience yield effects). This is because for securities supply is fixed, which
causes a bigger liquidity issue; whereas the types of supply and demand pressure
are much less likely to influence credit default swaps. Since new credit default
swaps can always be created rather than being “squeezed” like the underlying
corporate bonds, which means even if an investor wants to liquidate a credit
default swap position, it may be less costly to enter into a new swap in the
opposite direction rather than trying to sell the current position. Thus, the liq-
uidity of the current position is less relevant given one’s ability to replicate swap
cash flows through other contracts. Finally to support our assumption, Blance,
Brennan, and Marsh (2003)[4] find that credit derivative market is more liquid
than corporate bond market in the sense that new information is included into
CDS premia more rapidly than into corporate bond prices.
1Only reference entities that appears more than 5 series within the past 11 series are
selected to reduce the possible effect of liquidity.
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Previous papers such as Longstaff (2005)[58] find there is a big difference
between the spread obtained from the CDS market and the spread generated by
using bracketing bonds from the corporate bond market for the same underlying
reference entity. They explained that counterparty risk cannot fully explain the
difference between the spreads. Our model adds counterparty spread to CDS
spreads from the market, by doing so, we brought the CDS spread onto the same
platform as the spread generated by the bond market, we therefore found much
less difference between the spreads, which makes default risk a bigger component
than previous studies and liquidity risk does not count as big a proportion of
the total spread.
5.3.1 Risk-free Rate
To estimate the default component, we firstly need to identify a risk-free bench-
mark curve for the discount factor generation. Three risk-free curves have been
introduced in previous studies: The Treasury (Government Bond), Refcorp, and
swap curves.
1. Treasury Bill/ Government Bond curve is the original riskless benchmark
since it is the standard in most empirical tests in finance, it assumes the issuers,
who are usually government banks such as the US Federal Reserve or Bank of
England, do not default as sovereign issuers. Unless the entire country goes bust,
these counter-parties will not default. However, the Treasury/ Government
Bond curve has been challenged for its limited supply to the public, which
restricts its liquidity compared to swap curves, which is widely accepted as a
risk-free benchmark among the practitioners.
Here, because our study is based on European issued CDS and corporate
bonds, we use a generic European benchmark curve from Bloomberg as the risk-
free benchmark. The Euro Benchmarks Curve is comprised of Euro-denominated
fixed-rate government bonds from France and Germany. Bonds and bills are se-
lected based on the closest current nominal maturity to the indicated term. We
combine the liquidity spread of government bond together with the liquidity
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spread of corporate bond and model them together as one liquidity factor. This
is due to the fact that the European Benchmark shares the same liquidity issue
across the market so it only causes generic shift to the market if there is any
liquidity issue of the government bond.
2. The swap curve is widely accepted by practitioners to discount cashflows
in fixed income and its derivatives markets, however, the swap curve includes
both credit and default components. This makes it an ideal candidate to rep-
resent counterparty risk across the market. The complete list for all the 16
banks that currently contribute to the fixing of Euro bbalibor, which was last
reviewed in May 2009, is: Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd,
Barclays Bank plc, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC, JP
Morgan Chase, Lloyd’s Banking Group, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Rabobank,
Royal Bank of Canada, Société Générale, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group,
UBS AG, West LB AG.
With considerations due to current economic situation, bbalibor submits
from panel members the lowest inter-bank unsecured loan providers within the
money market. The banks listed above are also major CDS issuers in the credit
derivatives market, we use the banks above to represent the protection sellers of
CDSs, by doing this the credit risk within swap rates are representable as the
counterparty risk in the CDS premia.
During the credit crunch, the market realises the banks above cannot pro-
vide a default-free guarantee to products they provide, scandals from Société
Générale and the huge loss and later nationalisation of The Royal Bank of
Scotland Group indicates the importance of counterparty exposure within the
pricing of the derivatives they provide. Hence in our paper we do not believe
swap rates is a reliable default-free benchmark.
EURIBOR is the rate of interest at which panel banks borrow funds from
other panel banks, in marketable size, in the EU inter-bank market. In other
words, this is the rate at which participant banks within the European Union
money market will lend to another participant bank in the EU money market.
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Because banks involved with EURIBOR are the largest participants in the EU
money market, it has become the benchmark for short-term interest rates.
3. Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] and their previous papers introduced the
Refcorp curve as a benchmark curve, alongside with Treasury curves and Swap
curves for a comparison. They show that Refcorp bonds have the same default
risk as Treasury bonds, yet provide a better liquidity with less specialness to
the market than the Treasury bonds. Thus, they believe that the Refcorp curve
may provide a more accurate measure of the riskless curve than the Treasury
Curve. In this thesis, we only take the bond spread over government bonds and
swap rates, hence Refcorp is not considered.
Hull et al. (2004)[41] argue that credit default swaps can be used to imply
the risk-free rate assumed by traders, the risk-free rate used appears to be
approximately equal to the LIBOR/swap rate minus 10 basis points on average,
they argue that this estimate is plausible due to the counterparty risk of the
CDS seller. The credit risk in a swap rate is the credit risk from making a series
of 6-month loans to AA-rated counterparties and 10 basis points is a reasonable
default risk premium for an AA-rated 6-month instrument. This is the first
paper to incorporate the counterparty risk of swap issuer.
5.3.2 Data Collection and Process
For the Euro Benchmark Curve, we collect data for the constant maturity 3-
month, 6-month, each year between 1-year to 10-year, and 15-year. Firstly we
convert the annual par rates into semi annual basis, we then interpolate the
data into semi-annual intervals using cubic spline method, these par rates are
then bootstrapped to provide a discount curve at semi-annual intervals. We
then use the relationship below to derive zero rates from the discount curve.
Zero rates at other maturities are then derived by linearly interpolate the zero
rates at semi-annual tenor points, discount factor can then be calculated using
equation (5.2).
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DF =
1
(1 + ZR)
d/365
(5.2)
We collect Euro Swap Annual rates (Bloomberg ID: I53) for 1-month, 3-
month, 6-month, 9-month, each year between 1-year to 10-year, and 15-year
from the Bloomberg system. We follow the same algorithm as described above
for the Euro Benchmark Curve to obtain swap discount functions. In both Euro
benchmark curve and swap curve case, data up to 15 years or less are collected
since all of the corporate bonds in our sample have a maturity of 15 years and
less.
5.3.3 CDS Data
We select the underlying reference entities given the following standard:
We first select companies that frequently show up in CDS index iTraxx
Europe series 1-11 for investment grade, and iTraxx Crossover series 1-11 for
the lower boundary of investment grade. The iTraxx Europe index is the most
widely traded of all the indices, it is composed of the most liquid 125 CDS
referencing European investment grade credits, subject to certain sector rules
as determined by the IIC and also as determined by the SEC. There is also
significant volume, in nominal values, of trading in the HiVol and Crossover
indices.2
To guarantee the popularity in terms of trading, which indicates high liq-
uidity in terms of CDS and bond prices, we pick up reference entities that have
appeared more than 5 series out of 11 for further investigation.
Companies are chosen to be diversified to represent different industries such
as autos & industrials, consumers, energy, financials, and telecommunications.
Recovery rate is chosen to be 40%, which is the average recovery rate from
iTraxx Europe Series 11. Although various research has been done to show that
2HiVol is a subset of the main index consisting of what are seen as the most risky 30
constituents at the time the index is constructed. Crossover is constructed in a similar way
but is composed of 50 sub-investment grade credits.
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a constant recovery rate does not underperform the dynamically structured
recovery rate such as using beta distribution. Furthermore, it does not play a
big part on the pricing of CDS price or default component by changing the level
of recovery rate.
The contributing banks within Markit iTraxx Europe 3 index are leading in-
vestment banks, ABN AMRO (defaulted), Dresdner Kleinwort, Bank of Amer-
ica, BNP Paribas, Barclays Capital, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, RBS, UBS, and Wells
Fargo, from where we can see a great overlap with the panel of EURIBOR
banks.4
Our credit default swap data consists of a set of CDS spread quotes provided
by Datastream, which is a composite price from the contributors listed above.
The data contains 55 individual CDS quotes and covers 3 years of CDS quotes
from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Each quote contains the date of the quotes,
the name of the reference entity, and the spread is quoted in basis points. The
reference entity may be a financial institution such as BNP Paribas, an auto-
mobile company such as Volkswagen, or a telecommunication company such as
Vodafone. During the period covered by the data CDS quotes are provided on
55 named entities. The CDS rate quoted for any particular CDS depends on
the term of the CDS and the credit quality of the underlying asset. Majority of
the quotes lie within the range of 0 and 100 basis points for the period between
July 2004 and June 2007.
3The Markit iTraxx index family provides the market standards for investing, trading and
hedging and thus helps improve market liquidity. Index trades have increased rapidly in
recent years and represent more than 40% of overall credit derivatives volume.The rules-based
Markit iTraxx indices are comprised of the most liquid names in the European and Asian
markets. The selection methodology ensures that the indices are replicable and represent the
most liquid, traded part of the market.
4The following are licensed market makers for the Markit iTraxx Europe indices:
ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Bank of Montreal, Barclays Capital, Bayerische Landes-
bank, BBVA, BNP Paribas, CALYON, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort, DZ Bank, Goldman Sachs, Helaba Landesbank, Hessen-Thüringen,
HSBC, HSH, Nordbank, HypoVereinsbank, ING, IXIS, JP Morgan, Landesbank, Baden-
Württemberg, Merrill Lynch, Mitsubishi Securities, Morgan Stanley, Natixis, Nomura, Nord
LB, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Société Générale, UBS, and WestLB.
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5.3.4 Corporate Spread
5.3.4.1 Bond Data Selection
One obvious component of spread is the expected loss on corporate bond due
to default.
We adapt the same bracketing technique as mentioned in Longstaff’s paper
for companies with more than one bond available, although we do not eliminate
companies that have only one bond in the market.5 The advantage of using
bracketing bonds for the same entity is that it provides a better approximation
of the credit spread at 5 year horizon, by reducing the idiosyncratic risk that is
embedded in individual bonds.
We use the same underlyings as in the selection of reference entities in the
CDS spread, certain criteria are performed in order to filter out bond with poor
maintenance history or quality:
• Only SEC-registered Euro bonds are included;
• We pick the period between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2007 as observation
period, which means we need complete quotes from both the CDS and
bond markets between the observation period, therefore candidate bonds
should exist before July 1, 2004, and mature after June 30, 2007.
• where possible, larger issuers are chosen. Issuers with total notional
amount of less than 10 million euros are excluded.
• Only bonds with straight fixed-coupon are chosen, floating coupon bonds
and zero coupon bonds are excluded.
• Bonds with convertible features such as callable or puttable bonds are
excluded.
5we find that companies with only one bond available in the market, their bond tends to
have a strong indication to the CDS spread, whereas for companies with two many bonds
available, the indicative effect tends to be diluted, and companies with many bonds tend to
have much poorer liquidity than the single bond company.
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In order to select reference entities with bracketing bonds, at least two bonds
are included, as the 5-year maturity date for the period between the beginning
and end of observation date (July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007), is within the period
between July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2012. We first attempt to find a bond with
a maturity shorter than 5 years as the first observation date for the company,
which means we need to find a bond that has maturity between July 1, 2007 to
June 30, 2009. Also, we need to find bonds with a maturity longer than 5 years of
the last observation date for each company, which means we need to find bonds
with maturity later than June 30, 2009. Once the bonds defining the lower
and upper limit of the bracketing interval are selected, we then select bonds
with intermediate maturity dates to provide a roughly equal spaced coverage
of the bracketing interval. Some filtering of the bond yield data is necessary,
which concerns yields that change dramatically over a short period of time or
yields that have more than a month of missing data for any period between the
observation dates, which in fact eliminate a large portion of bond data available
from Datastream, a few underlying entities are excluded due to the poor quality
of their bond data.
5.3.4.2 Credit Spread Derivation from Bond Data
To compute the corporate spread the following procedure is used:
1. The bond yields from Datastream are all default prices, hence clean pric-
ing, therefore, for each observation, we need to add accrued interest onto
the clean price to get the dirty price of the bond.
2. For each corporate bond in the bracketing set, we calculate the theoretical
bond price by discounting all the outstanding coupons plus principle back
to each observation date using the discount curve of either benchmark
curve or swap curve, we then solve for the yield-to-maturity on a riskless
bond with the same maturity date and coupon rate.
3. Subtracting either the riskless benchmark yield or swap yield from the
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yield on the corporate bond gives the yield spread for that particular
corporate bond over benchmark curve and swap curve.
4. Regress the yield spreads for each individual bonds in the bracketing set
on their maturities in order to obtain a five-year-horizon yield spread for
the firm. We then use the fitted value of the regression at a five-year
horizon as the estimate of the corporate spread for the firm.
5. Check the results of the spread over the benchmark and swap curve with
the statics from Datastream and find out that the results are robust.
Fig. 5.1 plots the yield spread over benchmark and yield spread over swap curve,
together with credit default swap premium from the market during the sample
period. In the model independent approach, the credit default swap premium is
used as the estimate of the default component of the corporate spread. It shows
a strong trend of corporate bond spread with CDS premium, however, the CDS
spread shows a much closer range with bond spread over swap rather than bond
spread over benchmark curve. This is why previous studies such as Longstaff
et al. (2005)[58] conclude that swap spread provides a much better proxy for
default swap, and there is no clear indication of counterparty risk once swap
rates are picked as risk-less curve. However, they ignore counterparty risk in
the CDS premium, we show later in fig. 5.2 that by taking the difference between
the bond spread over benchmark curve and bond spread over swap curve as a
counterparty risk premium, and add it onto CDS premium from the market, the
newly adjusted CDS premium will not contain counterparty risk and provide
a much closer relationship to the bond spread over benchmark curve, which is
theoretically the risk-free curve.
5.3.5 CDS Spread with Counterparty Spread Proxy
As introduced before, this chapter assumes that the interest rate curve generated
from the government bond market has no default risk, whereas swap rates issued
by the participating EURIBOR banks tend to have counterparty credit risk,
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Figure 5.1: Plot of Spread over benchmark curve (SP), spread over swap curve
(SWSP), and CDS premium (with counterparty risk)
The CDS price has a much closer trend with spread over swap curve in terms of
trend and range than the bond spread over benchmark curve. Reference Entity:
Deutsche Telekom, Michelin; Sample period: July 1, 2004 - June 30, 2007.
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Figure 5.2: The difference between corporate bond spread over euro benchmark
curve and spread over euro swap curve
This shows a strong trend across bonds referencing difference entities. We use
this difference between the two spreads as a proxy to represent the counterparty
risk, and add it on top of credit spread quotes from the CDS market.
therefore we use the spread difference between bond spread over benchmark
curve and bond spread over swap curve to represent the spread of counterparty
risk, as shown in figure 5.2.
By assuming the independence between the risk-free curves and the CDS
premium, we use the difference between the Euro benchmark curve and the
Euro swap curve as a proxy to represent the counterparty risk, and add it on to
CDS spread from the market. Note that the interest rate swaps are also issued
by counterparties from the participating banks in iTraxx index or with similar
credit quality. This will guarantee that the adjusted CDS data is counterparty-
risk-free, and we assume there is no liquidity risk as we have picked up the most
liquid 5-year CDS spread. Detailed explanation can be found in Longstaff et al.
(2005)[58].6
Fig. 5.3 plots the yield spread over benchmark and yield spread over swap
curve, credit default swap premium from the market, and adjusted CDS pre-
6In case there is any liquidity risk left, we take the difference between the credit spread
from the bond market and the adjusted credit spread from the CDS market, and assume it
to be the liquidity risk difference between the CDS and bond market.
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mium with an added counterparty default proxy, during the sample period.
In the model independent approach, the credit-default swap premium is used
as the estimate of the default component of the corporate spread. It shows a
strong trend of corporate bond spread with the CDS premium, by adding the
counterparty default proxy.
5.4 Liquidity risk
We assume there is no liquidity risk in the CDS data, as we pick up the 5-year
CDS data which is recognised to be the most liquid out of all the CDS spreads
for the same underlyings, and we only pick up the ’frequent shower’ of the major
underlyings within the iTraxx series 1-11.7 Another important reason is that the
contractual nature of credit default swaps, rather than being a security, makes
them far less sensitive to liquidity or convenience yield effects. This means
that the types of supply and demand pressures that may affect corporate bonds
are much less likely to influence credit default swaps, where as for securities
supply is fixed. Since new credit default swaps can always be created rather
than being “squeezed” like the underlying corporate bonds, which means even
if an investor wants to liquidate a credit default swap position, it may be less
costly to enter into a new swap in the opposite direction rather than trying
to sell the current position. Thus, the liquidity of the current position is less
relevant given one’s ability to replicate swap cash flows through other contracts.
Finally to support our assumption, Blance, Brennan, and Marsh (2003)[4] find
that credit derivative market is more liquid than corporate bond markets in the
sense that new information is impounded into CDS premia more rapidly than
into corporate bond prices. A detailed explanation can be found in Longstaff
(2005)[58].
7Only reference entities that showed up in more than 5 series within the past 11 series are
selected to reduce the possible effect of liquidity.
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Figure 5.3: Plot of Spread over benchmark curve (SP), spread over swap curve
(SWSP), CDS premium, and adjusted counterparty-risk-free CDS premium
By adding the counterparty default proxy brings the CDS price to a similar
level to the corporate bond spread.
Reference Entity: Deutsche Telekom, Michelin; Sample period: July 1, 2004 -
June 30, 2007.
Chapter 6
The CIR Default Component
Calibration
Notation of Variables
λAt default intensity of protection buyer
λBt default intensity of protection seller
D(T ) the value of a riskless zero-coupon bond with maturity T
λt the intensity process λt, we assume that
α α, β, and σ are all positive constants, α/β is the mean-reverting
average
β mean-reverting speed
σ mean-reverting volatility
Zλ a standard Brownian motion
γt the liquidity process
η a positive constant
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Zγ another standard Brownian motion that is independent of Zλ
c the continuous coupon rate of a corporate bond
CB (c, w, T ) corporate bond price
rt short interest rate
s the premium of a CDS paid by the protection buyer, which is paid
continuously
P (s, T ) the present value of the premium leg of a CDS
PR (w, T ) the value of the protection leg of a CDS
w weight in the expected average value of λtw.
λCDS average of calibrated default intensities
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In this section we first introduce the model Longstaff et al. (2005)[58], it is based
on the framework introduced by Duffie and Singleton (1997)[25], where the
default intensity follows a CIR process. Based on this, Longstaff then calibrates
the parameters of the intensity process and liquidity component from bond and
CDS data, and calculate the default component.
In our approach we use the same intensity model as in Duffie and Singleton,
however, we use the same intensity model to calculate the total intensity using
both CDS (counterparty-risk adjusted) and bond data. We then take the dif-
ference between the intensity of CDS and bond data and put it as liquidity risk.
In doing this we simplify the model by reducing a separate step for bond data.
Also we find the parameter approximation performs better than Longstaff’s ap-
proach as by using Longstaff’s parameter approximation method, the liquidity
risk has very dramatic fluctuation which does not have explanatory power in the
real world. As we introduced before, using the counterparty-risk adjusted CDS
price reduce, if not eliminate, the impact counterparty play in CDS quotes, it
provides a less unbiased to the corporate bond spread over benchmark curve,
rather than close to the swap curve as previous studies conclude.
6.1 The Longstaff Approach
In the paper Longstaff (2005)[58], they assume that the CDS premium equals
the default component for the company’s bonds. Comparing the CDS premium
for a 5-year contract directly with the corporate spread for a 5-year bond pro-
vides a simple model-independent measure of the percentage size of the default
component. It is important to stress that this approach generally produces a
biased measure of the default component. Duffie (1999)[22] states that the CDS
premium should equal to the spread between corporate and riskless floating-rate
notes. However, Duffie and Liu (2001)[23] show that the corporate bond spread
over riskless bonds is generally not equal to the spread between corporate and
riskless floating-rate notes. In general, the effect of the bias is to underestimate
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the size of the default component in investment grade bonds, and vice versa for
below investment grade bonds. This can be avoided by using an explicit credit
model to make the adjustment from floating-rate to fixed-rate spreads. Ac-
cordingly, in Longstaff’s approach, they develop a simple closed-form model for
valuing credit-sensitive contracts and securities within the well-known reduced-
form framework of Duffie (1998)[21], Lando (1998)[53], Duffie and Singleton
(1997, 1999)[25, 26] and others. Once fitted to the data, their model can be
used to provide direct estimates of the default component of the spread implied
by credit-default premia.
Following Duffie and Singleton (1997)[25], let rt denote the riskless rate,
λt the intensity of the Poisson process governing default, and γt the liquidity
process that is used to capture the extra return investors may require above and
beyond compensation for credit risk, from holding corporate bond rather than
riskless securities. All of rt, λt, and γt are stochastic and evolve independently
of each other. According to Longstaff, this assumption simplifies the model but
has little effect on the empirical results. As in Lando (1998)[53], we assume that
a bondholder recovers a fraction of 1 − w of the par value of the bond in the
event of default, which means w is the loss rate, if w = 0.6, then the recovery
rate is 0.4.
Therefore, the value of a riskless zero-coupon bond D(T ) with maturity T
is expressed as1:
D (T ) = E
[
exp
(
−
ˆ T
0
rtdt
)]
. (6.1)
To specify the risk-neutral dynamics of the intensity process λt, we assume
that
dλ = (α− βλ) dt+ σ
√
λdZλ, (6.2)
where α, β, and σ are all positive constants, and Zλ is a standard Brownian
1given the independence assumption, we do not need to specify the risk-neutral dynamics
of the riskless rate to solve for credit default swap premia and corporate bond prices.
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motion. This is the same approach Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (CIR) develop in
1985 for short-term interest rate model. It allows both mean reverting and con-
ditional heteroskedasticity in corporate spreads and guarantees that the inten-
sity process is always non-negative. The risk-neutral dynamics of the liquidity
process γt is
dγ = ηdZγ , (6.3)
where η is a positive constant and Zγ is another standard Brownian motion
that is independent of Zλ. This allows the liquidity process to take on both
positive and negative values.
Following Duffie (1998)[21], Lando (1998)[53], Duffie and Singleton (1999)[22]
and others, it is straightforward to represent the values of corporate bonds and
the premium and protection legs of a CDS contract as simple expectations
under the risk-neutral measure. Let c denote the coupon rate of a corporate
bond, which is a continuous term. Therefore the price of this corporate bond
CB (c, w, T ) can be expressed as
CB (c, w, T ) = E
[
c
ˆ T
0
exp
(
−
ˆ t
0
rs + λs + γsds
)
dt
]
+E
[
exp
(
−
ˆ T
0
rt + λt + γtdt
)]
+E
[
(1− w)
ˆ T
0
λt exp
(
−
ˆ t
0
rs + λs + γsds
)
dt
]
.(6.4)
In which the first term in this expression is the present value of the promised
coupon payments by the bond contract, the second term is the present value
of the promised principal payment, and the third term is the present value of
recovery payment once the underlying defaults. In each term, cashflows are
discounted at the credit and liquidity adjusted rate rt + λt + γt.
For the valuation of a CDS contract, recall that swaps are contracts, not
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securities, hence the contractual nature of CDS makes them far less sensitive
to liquidity effect. Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] explain in details the difference
in response to liquidity effect between contracts and securities. We select un-
derlyings from the 125 names in iTraxx Europe, out of all their CDS contracts
we pick up 5-year maturity which is believed to be the most liquid contracts
given the same underlyings. Therefore, given the discussion above, we assume
liquidity process γt only apply to cashflows from corporate bonds, but not to
cashflows from CDS contracts. Alternatively, γt can also be considered as the
difference between the liquidity of corporate securities and the liquidity of CDS
contracts.
Let s denotes the premium paid by the protection buyer, and assume that
the premium is paid continuously, the present value of the premium leg of a
CDS can be expressed as
P (s, T ) = E
[
s
ˆ T
0
exp
(
−
ˆ t
0
rs + λsds
)
dt
]
. (6.5)
Similarly, the value of the protection leg is
PR (w, T ) = E
[
w
ˆ T
0
λt exp
(
−
ˆ t
0
rs + λsds
)
dt
]
. (6.6)
Setting the premium leg equal to the protection leg and solve for the premium
gives
s =
E
[
w
´ T
0
λt exp
(
− ´ t
0
rs + λsds
)
dt
]
E
[´ T
0
exp
(
− ´ t
0
rs + λsds
)
dt
] . (6.7)
From which we can see if λt is not stochastic, the premium is simply λw.
Even if λt is stochastic, the premium can be expressed as a weighted average
present value of λtw.2
Therefore, given the square-root dynamic for the intensity process λt and
2In general, given the negative correlation between λt and exp
(
− ´ t0 λsds
)
, the premium
should be less than the expected average value of λtw.
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the liquidity process γt, Longstaff et al. (2005)[58] derive a closed-form solution
for the expectation terms in equations (6.4) and (6.10). Detailed derivation can
be found in Appendix A. Therefore the value of a corporate bond is
CB (c, w, T ) = c
ˆ T
0
A (t) exp (B (t)λ)C (t)D (t) e−γtdt
+A (t) exp (B (T )λ)C (T )D (T ) e−γT (6.8)
+ (1− w)
ˆ T
0
exp (B (t)λ)C (t)D (t) (G (t) +H (t)λ) e−γtdt,
where
A (t) = exp
(
α (β + φ)
σ2
t
)(
1− κ
1− κeφt
) 2α
σ2
,
B (t) =
β − φ
σ2
+
2φ
σ2 (1− κeφt) ,
C (t) = exp
(
η2t3
6
)
,
G (t) =
α
φ
(
eφt − 1) exp(α (β + φ)
σ2
t
)(
1− κ
1− κeφt
) 2α
σ2
+1
,
H (t) = exp
(
α (β + φ) + φσ2
σ2
t
)(
1− κ
1− κeφt
) 2α
σ2
+2
,
φ =
√
2σ2 + β2,
and
κ =
β + φ
β − φ.
And the closed-form solution for CDS premium is
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s =
w
´ T
0
exp (B (t)λ)D (t) (G (t) +H (t)λ) dt´ T
0
A (t) exp (B (t)λ)D (t) dt
. (6.9)
With these closed-form solutions, Longstaff et al.(2005)[58] fits the model to
match simultaneously the CDS premia and prices for a set of bracketing bonds
with maturities span around the 5-year horizon of the CDS contract. They first
choose a set of values for parameters α, β, σ, and η, and then calibrate the exact
default intensity from the CDS premium. They then put the parameters and
default intensity into the bond prices, and derive the process of the liquidity for
each observation date. Different sets of parameters are then chosen and the one
with the least Root-Mean-Squared-Error (RMSE) is picked up to represent the
parameters for default intensity and liquidity process.
6.1.1 Extension and Simplification of the Longstaff Model
In this thesis, we use similar terms for default intensity, however, we treat the
counterparty-adjusted CDS premium and bond spread over benchmark curve
equally, and calculate their individual default intensity using equation (6.10),
which is the same method to solve default swap premium for a CDS contract.
However, since we have derived 5 year spread over benchmark curve from the
bond market data already, we just use that spread as a total spread and derive
the total intensity of credit and liquidity, which mean the calibrated intensity
will equal to the sum of λs + γs for bond market, and λs only for CDS market
data. By assuming no correlation between the intensity of the reference entity
and the liquidity factor of corporate bond, we take the difference between the
intensities derived from the bond market (spread over benchmark curve) and
CDS market (counterparty-risk adjusted CDS premium) and leave it as the
liquidity difference between the two markets.
s =
w
´ T
0
exp (B (t)λ)D (t) (G (t) +H (t)λ) dt´ T
0
A (t) exp (B (t)λ)D (t) dt
. (6.10)
In this way, we do not need to calibrate the liquidity process from the long
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equation of corporate bond price as in eq. (6.8), we simply derive it from the
difference between the intensities. It is more efficient in a way if there are too
many parameters in a equation to calibrate/approximate, the ultimate result
may not be as representable and will be lack of practical sense.
6.2 The Volkswagen Case Study
In order to demonstrate the methodology introduced above, we choose certain
firms to illustrate the effect of counterparty risk and liquidity risk. Volkswagen
is picked from the 55 underlying firms to represent the typical, not necessary the
best, results of the companies we study in this thesis. As introduced before, two
major types of VW data are used in this case study: CDS premia and corporate
bond yields.
As usual, CDS data is the mid rate on VW from Datastream during the
period from July 1 2004 to June 30 2007, which is a composite price of major
contributing banks. This means quotations should be representative of counter-
parties across the entire CDS market. In order to match each CDS spread rate
across the 3-year observation horizon with a 5 year maturity, we need to select
representative bonds issued on VW and regress out a credit default spread with
a 5 year maturity.
Since we have picked CDS data with all 5-year maturities, it would make
sense to have a matching 5-year bond available for each observation date of the
3 years horizon that selected, however, this is not possible to find in reality. To
address this problem, we select a set of bonds with maturities that bracket the
5-year maturity of the CDS from 2009 to 2012, 5 bonds on VW are selected
with maturity listed on the right, trying to provide an equally spaced interval,
these 5 bonds are all fixed-rate straight bond Euro-dominated debt obligations
of VW and do not have any embedded options. To minimise the effects of
illiquidity, only bonds that are registered with SEC are included in the set.
The coupon rates for these bonds range from 4.125% to 5.375%, the maturities
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range from March 10, 2008 to May 22, 2013. We refer this set of bonds as the
bracketing set for VW. The bond yields are then obtained by manipulating each
bond with a coupon bond with same maturity and coupon rate using the Euro
benchmark curve and Euro swap curve as their riskfree alternative. Differences
are then taken between the VW bonds and its risk-free alternative to get the
bond spread over benchmark curve and swap curve. We conduct a number of
robustness comparisons using data for the bonds from Datastream to verify that
our data are reliable.
The spreads are as shown in figure 6.1, the first graph is the calculated spread
over benchmark curve and the middle graph is the calculated spread over swap
curve, the bottom graph is calculated by regressing on the 5 representative
bonds for each observation date to get the bond spread over benchmark/swap
with a 5 year maturity in order to match the same format as the CDS data.
As one can see, there is a significant difference between the bond spread over
benchmark curve and bond spread over swap curve, which we can use as the
spread for counterparty risk and add it onto CDS spread to make it counterparty
risk free. Hence the first plot of figure 6.2 shows the adjusted CDS spread after
the counterparty effect component is added on. Together with the bond spread
over benchmark curve and swap curve. One can see the CDS spread is brought
to a similar level to the spread over benchmark curve, rather than showing a
misleading “close” relationship with the bond spread over swap curve.
To estimate the discount function D (T ) for each observation date, we firstly
identify the riskless curve as the generic Euro benchmark curve which is a com-
posite of French and German government bonds. This is done by collecting
Euro Benchmark curve rates for the constant maturity 3-month, 6-month, each
year from 1-year to 10-year and 15-year. We then apply a cubic-spline method
to interpolate the par rates at semi-annual tenor points, which are then boot-
strapped to provide zero rates at semi-annual intervals. In order to obtain zero
rates and then discount factor at other maturities, linear interpolation is applied
directly between adjacent semi-annual tenor points.
CHAPTER 6. THE CIR DEFAULT COMPONENT CALIBRATION 104
Figure 6.1: Calculated Bond spread over benchmark curve and bond spread
over swap curve
Obtained from regressing 5 representative bonds issued by Volkswagen over a
5-year horizon.
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To estimate the parameters for the intensity process λCt for the CDS spread.
We first pick up trial values for parameters αC , βC , and σC for the CIR credit
spread process on the counterparty risk adjusted CDS premium. For each set
of parameters, we solve for the default intensity λCt value for each observation
date, we then try on different set values of the three parameters to get the global
minimum of the RMSE (root-mean-square-error) value, with the condition that
α, β, and σ are all positive. We then adjust the outcome value of α/β to
make sure it is in sync with the long term mean of the intensity, and also the
value σ
√
λ to make sure it is representable to the volatility of the credit spread.
We then do the same for the 5-year bond spread to calibrate parameters αB ,
βB , and σB which provide the best fit for λCt which provide in-sync value of
long-term mean and volatility of the spread. We notice later as in Table 6.3,
that the mean reverting speed factor β for all the CDS and bond spreads proves
relatively stable across all the companies. By changing β it only causes a parallel
shift to the solved intensity values, therefore it makes sense to keep the mean-
reverting speed stable to provide all the intensity values on the same scale.
Throughout this procedure, we hold the loss rate w constant at 60%, which
means the recovery rate is 40%, we find that the estimation results are identical
when other values of w are used.
This estimation procedure has several advantages: firstly, by fitting intensity
to a cross section of bonds with maturities that bracket the maturity of the credit
default swap (counterparty-risk adjusted), the effect of any measurement error
in individual bond prices on the results are minimised. We average out the
effect of idiosyncratic pricing errors in individual bonds. However, companies
that have only one bond in the fixed income market are still included, we find
that the bond spread of these companies has a strong correlation with the CDS
premium as it is the only available bond in the market, therefore CDS seller
and investors take the bond price as an important indicator when it comes to
price the default swap of the same underlying.
Therefore, the estimated dynamics of the intensity process for CDS spread
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for VW is
dλC = (0.001658− 0.28137λC)dt+ 0.01950
√
λCdZC . (6.11)
Similarly, the estimated dynamics of the intensity process for bond spread
over benchmark for VW is
dλB = (0.001349− 0.28231λB)dt+ 0.01837
√
λBdZB . (6.12)
Figure 6.2 shows the calibrated default intensity of Volkswagen in the second
graph, it illustrates a strong relationship between the CDS derived intensity λC
and bond derived intensity λB . The liquidity effect, which is the difference
between the CDS intensity and Bond intensity, contributes less than 20% on
average of the CDS intensity. This shows relatively small liquidity effect from
the bond market, majority of the intensity is explained by the default risk of
the underlying reference entity.
It also makes sense that the CDS intensity is higher than the bond intensity
as the CDS market is generally more liquid than the bond market, which mean
investors would like to pay higher price for higher liquid instruments, hence, the
flight to liquidity.
6.3 Alternative Explanation
6.3.1 Flight to Liquidity
Longstaff (2004)[57] examines the existence of a flight to liquidity premium in
Treasury bond prices by comparing them with prices of bonds issued by Ref-
corp, a U.S. Government agency. These bonds are guaranteed by the Treasury,
therefore shares the same credit risk as Treasury bonds. A large liquidity pre-
mium in Treasury bonds, which can be more than 15% of the value of some
Treasury bonds, is found. This liquidity premium is believed to be related to
changes in consumer confidence, the amount of Treasury debt available to in-
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Figure 6.2: Volkswagen’s credit spreads and decomposition
The first graph plots Volkswagen’s bond spread over benchmark curve and swap
curve individually, and credit default swap rates before and after the adjustment
of counterparty risk proxy; The second graph shows the calibrated default in-
tensity from VW’s adjusted CDS spread and intensity from VW’s bond spread.
The liquidity curve shows the difference between the two intensity processes.
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vestors, and flows into equity and money market mutual funds. This suggests
that the popularity of Treasury bonds directly affects their value.
He finds that during the past decade, there are often large liquidity premia
in Treasury bond prices. In some cases, these premia can represent as much as
10%-15% of the value of the Treasury bond. An explanatory analysis reveals
that these flight to liquidity premia are related to a variety of market senti-
ment measures, such as changes in consumer confidence and in the amount of
funds flowing into equity and money market mutual funds. Furthermore, the
flight to liquidity premia are directly related to changes in the supply of Trea-
sury securities available to investors resulting from the recent treasury buyback
program.
Same concerns can arise in our study, however, it involves the liquidity differ-
ence between Euro Government bonds and swaps rates, which are both believed
to be liquidly exchanged. Swaps, however, are believed to be more liquid than
Euro Government Bonds. This could affect the explanatory power of using the
Euro Government bond rates instead of the Euro Swap rates as riskless bench-
mark. This means the usual counterparty spread premium of an average 15-20
basis points can partially be explained by the liquidity difference between the
Euro Government Bond rates and the Euro Swap rates.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
Looking at Table 6.3 below we can see the parameters for each underlying within
our study describing the property of their default intensity process, one may
notice that financial institutions show a much lower long-term mean (α) for the
change of default intensity, and also a lower mean of the default intensity itself,
comparing to other industries. This could be due to the fact that the financial
institutions are relatively higher rated than the rest of the sample population;
also the banks below are already contributors of the counterparties, hence when
subtracting the counterparty risk from the credit spread, (by actually adding
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the difference between the government bond spread and the swap spread on top
of credit spread), their own default risk is partially subtracted/eliminated.
6.4.1 Bond Spread Difference as Counterparty Default Risk
Proxy
By taking the difference between the government bond yield and swap yield
as the proxy for global counterparty risk, and adding it onto the CDS spread,
we bring the default component to the same level as the spread derived from
corporate bonds. In which the counterparty-risk adjusted CDS spread represents
only the pure credit spread over the underlying reference entity’s default risks.
Whereas the original CDS spread provided by the market still has the impurity
of counterparty default risk. For a firm who does not have sufficient information
in the bond market, one can easily extend the same approach and obtain its
counterparty-risk-free credit spread, by adding the counterparty spread on top
of its credit spread from the CDS market.
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Sector Firm α β σ λCDS No. of Bond
Autos AB Volvo 0.00130 0.28283 0.01168 0.01040 2
Autos BMW 0.00101 0.28344 0.00652 0.00810 4
Autos Michelin 0.00145 0.28212 0.00976 0.01162 1
Autos Renault 0.00152 0.28221 0.00963 0.01217 3
Autos Volkswagen 0.00166 0.28137 0.01950 0.01331 1
Consumers Ahold 0.00384 0.27363 0.03358 0.03135 1
Consumers Altadis 0.00151 0.28259 0.02151 0.01211 1
Consumers BAT 0.00158 0.28149 0.01492 0.01269 3
Consumers Carrefour 0.00103 0.28381 0.00874 0.00821 4
Consumers Casino 0.00260 0.27788 0.02275 0.02102 5
Consumers Metro 0.00158 0.28176 0.00736 0.01269 1
Consumers MOET 0.00130 0.28267 0.00542 0.01040 3
Energy E.ON 0.00100 0.28384 0.00770 0.00795 2
Energy Electricite de France 0.00092 0.28377 0.00571 0.00738 7
Energy Endesa 0.00116 0.28294 0.00751 0.00925 3
Energy ENEL 0.00095 0.28400 0.00641 0.00757 4
Energy Fortum 0.00110 0.28310 0.00848 0.00880 2
Energy Iberdrola 0.00100 0.28407 0.01021 0.00856 3
Energy National Grid 0.00110 0.28362 0.01116 0.00881 1
Energy Repsol 0.00139 0.28248 0.00849 0.01114 2
Energy RWE 0.00094 0.28379 0.00542 0.00752 6
Energy TOTAL 0.00073 0.28474 0.00645 0.00584 14
Energy Vattenfall 0.00106 0.28337 0.00610 0.00844 4
Energy Veolia 0.00128 0.28276 0.00819 0.01027 2
Financials ABN AMRO 0.00072 0.28438 0.00598 0.00574 21
Financials Allianz 0.00091 0.28365 0.00704 0.00725 4
Financials AXA 0.00104 0.28322 0.00704 0.00830 2
Financials Banco Bilbao 0.00076 0.28473 0.00801 0.00608 8
Financials Barclays 0.00070 0.28485 0.00767 0.00554 2
Financials Bco Santander 0.00078 0.28460 0.00703 0.00622 5
Financials BNP Paribas 0.00070 0.28473 0.00494 0.00554 12
Financials Commerz Bank 0.00091 0.28365 0.00704 0.00725 7
Financials Deutsche Bank 0.00087 0.28394 0.00605 0.00697 3
Financials Dresner Bank 0.00083 0.28402 0.00495 0.00662 7
Financials HBOS 0.00073 0.28459 0.00481 0.00584 7
Financials HSBC 0.00072 0.28468 0.00581 0.00577 2
Financials ING 0.00071 0.28481 0.00617 0.00562 11
Financials Loylds TSB 0.00069 0.28473 0.00524 0.00550 3
Financials RBS 0.00072 0.28439 0.00549 0.00574 4
Financials San Paolo 0.00079 0.28432 0.00550 0.00631 5
Financials Société Générale 0.00073 0.28463 0.00526 0.00578 18
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Sector Firm α β σ λCDS No. of Bond
Industrials Arcelor 0.00179 0.28081 0.01708 0.01442 4
Industrials Deutsche Post 0.00103 0.28388 0.00959 0.00819 7
Industrials Gecina 0.00281 0.27755 0.04552 0.02271 3
Industrials Investor 0.00101 0.28351 0.00719 0.00806 3
Industrials Lafarge 0.00154 0.28190 0.00902 0.01233 1
Industrials Solvay 0.00106 0.28335 0.01016 0.00845 2
Industrials UPM 0.00170 0.28161 0.01229 0.01363 2
TMT Alcatel 0.00344 0.27604 0.02131 0.02786 1
TMT Deutsche Telekom 0.00154 0.28202 0.00962 0.01232 7
TMT France Telecom 0.00154 0.28182 0.01049 0.01234 7
TMT Telefonica 0.00164 0.28162 0.01331 0.01318 3
TMT Telenor 0.00122 0.28295 0.01249 0.00978 1
TMT Vodafone 0.00128 0.28303 0.0975 0.01026 4
TMT Wolters 0.00176 0.28106 0.01892 0.01412 1
Table 6.3: Table of parameters under CIR framework for credit spreads
The table shows long term mean, mean reverting speed, and volatility for each
of the sample 55 underlying entities. Default intesnsity is calculated given the
processed credit spread without the effect of counterparty risk.
Chapter 7
Crisis Time Study
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigated the existence and impact of counter-
party risk and quantify the counterparty risk by using the difference between the
spread over benchmark and spread over swap as a proxy, using data spanning
July 2004 to June 2007. In this chapter, we use a different set of data from July
2007 to June 2009, in order to see how the counterparty risk changes during the
credit crunch period.
We further validate our approach by doing a comparison with Mercurio
(2009)[61], whose study on the interest swap rates discrepancy on counterparty
risk matches our findings. By finding great similarity we can conclude that our
proxy for counterparty risk can be extended from credit swap market to interest
rate swap market.
7.2 Alternative Counterparty Proxy
Mercurio (2009)[61] describes the major changes that occurred in the quotes
of market rates after 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis. He comments on the
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lost analogies and consistencies of rates once closely interconnected1, and hints
on a possible, simple way to formally reconcile them, part of which mentioned
the discrepancy of “last” one-month EONIA rates and one-month deposit rates,
from November 14th, 2005 to November 12, 2008, it can be observed that the
basis was well below 10 bps until August 2007. However, since then it has
started to move erratically around different levels, which is believed to be due
to counterparty risk.
He notices that once compatible rates, such as 3x6 EONIA forward rates and
3x6 FRA rates, three-month LIBOR rate and six-month LIBOR rate, began to
diverge substantially since the credit crunch of the sub-prime mortgage market,
producing a clear segmentation of market rates.
Now the FRA cannot be priced as a trivial forward on a LIBOR rate, as it
used to be, at least approximately. One possible explanation is the increased
perception of bank-vs-bank counterparty/liquidity risk after the burst of sub-
prime crisis. The presence of counterparty/liquidity risk in LIBOR market
quotes is often estimated based on the difference between LIBOR rates and rates
theoretically free of such counterparty/liquidity risk, such as EONIA. Thus now
the risk-free rate is taken to be EONIA, whereas LIBOR would be a different
default risky rate.
7.2.1 Figure Comparison
All those rates, which were very closely interconnected, suddenly became differ-
ent objects, each one incorporating their own liquidity or credit premium. Take
1m EONIA and 1m deposit rate for example. EONIA is the weighted average
of overnight Euro Inter-bank Offer Rates for inter-bank loans, it is the standard
interest rate for Euro currency deposits. The European Central Bank is respon-
sible for calculating the EONIA every day. Fig. 7.1 shows the spread between
1m EONIA rates, which is believed to be sensitive to counterparty risk, and 1m
1Such as 3x6 EONIA forward rates vs. 3x6 FRA rates, and three-month LIBOR rate and
six-month LIBOR rate, those pair of rates were once compatible, however, diverge substan-
tially once the the sub-prime mortgage crisis has started.
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deposit rate, which is believe to be counterparty-risk free.
We notice that the jump in counterparty spread is strongly linked to the
major events during the sub-prime crisis, to be more specific, the default of
banks, the major events first kick off at Bear Stearns’ $3.2bn bail-out of its
struggling hedge funds in June 2007, it is followed by the write-down in bad
loans and mortgage-backed securities, and reported losses by big banks and
their subsidiary hedge funds, such as UBS, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Goldman
Sachs, and Northern Rock, Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, BNP
Paribas near the end of 2007 at different levels. In March 2008, Bear Stearns
was acquired by JP Morgan Chase for just $240 million under FED pressure in
an emergency rescue takeover.
The credit crisis reached its peak when in September 2008, on September
7th, Federal takes over mortgage finance agencies Fannia Mae and Freddie Mac
and effectively nationalised them; On Sept. 14th, Merrill Lynch was taken
over by bank of America Corp; On 15th September, Lehman Brothers, after
days of searching frantically for a buyer, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
protection, becoming the first major bank to collapse since the start of the credit
crisis; The next day, on 16th September, the US Federal Reserve announced an
$85 rescue package for AIG, the country’s biggest insurance company, to save
it from bankruptcy. And the day after that, Lloyds TSB announced it is to
take over Britain’s biggest mortgage lender HBOS in a £12bn deal creating
a banking giant holding close to one-third of the UK’s savings and mortgage
market. Then on 25th September, in the largest bank failure yet in the United
States, Washington Mutual, a giant mortgage lender, who had assets valued
at $307bn, is closed down by regulators and sold to JPMorgan Chase, not to
mention the partial nationalisation of European banking and insurance giant
Fortis, nationalisation of mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley in Britain, the
Icelandic government took control and nationalised the country’s three major
banks, Glitnir, after the company faces short-term funding problems; the bail-
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Figure 7.1: Euro 1m EONIA rates vs. 1m deposit rates from 15 Jan. 2004 to
20 Aug. 2009
Source: Bloomberg.
Figure 7.2: Plot of 3M, 1Y and 5Y counterparty spread
The difference between Euro Swap rate and Euro Benchmark rate is defined as
counterpaty-risk proxy, and compared to Mercurio (2009), who uses the differ-
ence between 1M EONIA vs. Deposit rates.
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out of Dexia, which all happened in a very short period of time at the end of
September 2008.
All the major events mentioned above damage the credibility among banks
as counterparty and major player of vast majority of the derivatives in the credit
market, and hence the big jump in terms of counterparty risk can all be observed
in figure 7.1 and 7.2.
Fig. 7.2, shows the strong similarity between Mercurio (2009)’s finding and
the findings within this chapter, where we obtain counterparty spread by taking
the difference between EURIBOR2 and Euro Benchmark rates. We compare
the 1M counterparty risk in Mercurio (2009)[61] to a range of term structure
of 3M, 1Y, and 5Y, we can see the counterparty spread does exist before crisis
period, where as the difference between EONIA and deposit rate in Mercurio’s
paper is close to zero. Also the 3M counterparty risk is the most extreme in
terms of volatility and magnitude, it is close to the 1M counterparty spread
in Mercurio’s paper and shares the same shape and match at peaks. Also as
one can see from the counterparty spread of 1Y and 5Y, the spread tend to
scale down and become less volatile due to the longer time horizon into the
future, rather than very spot sensitive at current date like 1M and 3M. We
believe that using the difference between Euro swap rate and Euro Benchmark
rate provides a more consistent proxy before and after the credit crunch, rather
than the abrupt jumps of the 1m proxy for counterparty risk. In doing this,
we also monitor the term structure of counterparty risk and observe its shape
and behaviour at different time such as normal and excited state of the market,
which we will discuss in detail later.
The above investigation validate our counterparty spread as a sound proxy
for approximating counterparty risk, therefore, we carry on using the same
framework as in Chapter 5 to calibrate spread dynamic parameters using the
2EURIBOR: The rate of interest at which panel banks borrow funds from other panel
banks, in marketable size, in the EU interbank market. In other words, this is the rate
at which participant banks within the European Union money market will lend to another
participant bank in the EU money market. Because banks involved with EURIBOR are
the largest participants in the EU money market, this rate has become the benchmark for
short-term interest rates.
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Cox–Ingersoll–Ross model, during the sub-prime mortgage cirsis period.
7.3 Carry-On study on Crisis Time
Carrying on the same theory and methodology from previous chapter on 5 year
CDS counterparty risk by taking the difference between bond spread over the
Euro Benchmark curve and bond spread over the swap curve. We replace the
date using July 2nd 2007 till June 30th 2009, taking the difference between
spread over Euro benchmark and spread over swap as a proxy for counterparty
risk, and add it to the CDS spread and Bond spread to derive counterparty-risk
free spread curve. We then follow the same CIR model for credit default intensity
and calibrate daily intensity rates based on the counterparty-risk adjusted credit
spread. Table 7.3 below shows calibrated parameters for CDS spread derived
intensity process, with long term mean of dλ, volatility σ, and average of CDS
spread intensity all much higher than “peaceful” time between July 2004 to June
2007, mean reversion spread become more diversified and lower than “peaceful”
time, which makes default intensity more diverse.
From figure 7.3 we could see the CDS market and bond market still have a
very good connection in terms of representing the default risk of the underlying
entity. However, the CDS market provides a much more liquid in terms of
response to market shocks, where as bond market does similar trend as CDS
spread given market condition with much less volatile.
Blue line shows daily intensity rates calibrated from the CDS spread plus
counterparty spread; red line shows intensity calibrated from the bond spread
plus counterparty spread; green line shows the difference between intensities
derived from both markets and represents the liquidity different between these
two markets. As one could observe, the CDS market provides much more volatile
intensity rates, and responds to market information faster than bond market.
On the other hand, the bond market remains a good candidate to represent
the credit quality of an underlying firm for keeping up the same magnitude of
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Sector Firm α β σ λCDS No. of Bond
Autos AB Volvo 0.00675 0.24823 0.11447 0.02719 2
Autos Michelin 0.00654 0.25473 0.09384 0.02568 1
Autos Renault 0.00701 0.25156 0.09745 0.02787 3
Autos Volkswagen 0.00526 0.2634 0.06893 0.01997 1
Consumers Ahold 0.00502 0.26672 0.05578 0.01882 1
Consumers Altadis 0.00342 0.27453 0.03421 0.01245 1
Consumers BAT 0.00349 0.27308 0.04225 0.01279 3
Consumers Carrefour 0.00295 0.27527 0.03640 0.01072 4
Consumers Casino 0.00508 0.26114 0.05835 0.01909 5
Consumers Metro 0.00773 0.24065 0.12625 0.03212 1
Energy E.ON 0.00294 0.27556 0.03489 0.01065 2
Energy Electricite de France 0.00292 0.27434 0.45992 0.01063 7
Energy Endesa 0.00513 0.25712 0.10502 0.01995 3
Energy ENEL 0.00556 0.25430 0.11034 0.02183 4
Energy Fortum 0.00305 0.27465 0.03934 0.01109 2
Energy Iberdrola 0.00398 0.27025 0.05178 0.01472 3
Energy National Grid 0.00434 0.26719 0.06299 0.01624 1
Energy Repsol 0.00511 0.26076 0.08744 0.01960 2
Energy RWE 0.00282 0.27586 0.03336 0.27986 6
Energy TOTAL 0.00286 0.27433 0.04546 0.01044 14
Energy Vattenfall 0.00319 0.27424 0.03668 0.01163 4
Energy Veolia 0.00384 0.27141 0.04326 0.01417 2
Financials ABN AMRO 0.00841 0.24843 0.03734 0.01276 21
Financials Allianz 0.00351 0.27292 0.04048 0.01286 4
Financials AXA 0.00449 0.26792 0.05711 0.01677 2
Financials Banco Bilbao 0.00349 0.27324 0.03881 0.01276 8
Financials Barclays 0.00441 0.26844 0.05426 0.01641 2
Financials Bco Santander 0.00360 0.27283 0.03983 0.01319 5
Financials BNP Paribas 0.00300 0.27534 0.03314 0.01087 12
Financials Commerz Bank 0.00359 0.27362 0.03263 0.01311 7
Financials Deutsche Bank 0.00377 0.27212 0.04107 0.01384 3
Financials Dresner Bank 0.00365 0.27329 0.03504 0.01335 7
Financials HBOS 0.00481 0.26771 0.05584 0.01795 7
Financials HSBC 0.00342 0.27298 0.04178 0.01253 2
Financials ING 0.00371 0.27188 0.04592 0.01363 11
Financials RBS 0.00434 0.26892 0.05263 0.01613 4
Financials Société Générale 0.00353 0.27317 0.03909 0.01294 18
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Sector Firm α β σ λCDS No. of Bond
Industrials Arcelor 0.01053 0.20127 0.09570 0.05231 4
Industrials Deutsche Post 0.00293 0.27554 0.03441 0.01062 7
Industrials Gecina 0.01264 0.20730 0.15416 0.06099 3
Industrials Investor 0.00435 0.26540 0.07574 0.01638 3
Industrials Lafarge 0.00787 0.23346 0.15172 0.03373 1
Industrials UPM 0.00857 0.2505 0.07575 0.03422 2
TMT Alcatel 0.01449 0.19889 0.14080 0.07287 1
TMT Deutsche Telekom 0.00373 0.27289 0.03902 0.01368 7
TMT France Telecom 0.00339 0.27443 0.03861 0.01234 7
TMT Telefonica 0.00418 0.27065 0.04566 0.01545 3
TMT Telenor 0.00405 0.26971 0.04955 0.01503 1
TMT Wolters 0.00314 0.27528 0.03457 0.01143 1
Table 7.3: Credit spread parameters under CIR model
During credit crunch period (July 2007 - June 2009).
intensity rate with the CDS market, provided with a diversified, liquid number
of bonds for the reference entity.
For the financial markets, bond spreads tend to be higher than CDS spreads,
which shows a higher anxiety from the fixed income market rather than credit
derivatives market. Energy and Telecommunication markets show a close rela-
tionship between intensities from CDS market and bond market, given they are
usually big corporations and issue a well diversified number of bonds, and are
liquidly traded in the bond market. Whereas for automobile market, which is
indirectly influenced by the credit crunch, shows a rather slow response from
the bond market. Intensity from the bond market is relatively smoother and
smaller in magnitude than the default intensity from the CDS market, investors
in the bond market for automobile companies only start “panicking” after the
September 2008 events. One can see the intensity only begin to increase dra-
matically and chase up with the CDS spread intensity, which also shows an
illiquid bond market in that industry.
One of the promising prospects in a liquid CDS market is that it provides
better information on the term structure of credit risk for specific issuers. First
of all, issuing a CDS on a particular firm does not change the capital structure
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Figure 7.3: Sample plots of default intensity rate λ in Financial and Energy
sector
Blue line shows default intensity from CDS market, red line shows default in-
tensity derived from bond market. All the CDS spreads are counterparty-risk
adjusted.
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Figure 7.4: Sample plot of default intensity rate λ in TMT and Autos sector
Blue line shows default intensity from the CDS market, red line shows default
intensity derived from the bond market. All the CDS spreads are counterparty-
risk adjusted.
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of the firm, which makes it reasonable to assume that the price behaves linearly
in the underlying amount insured over wider intervals. Secondly, the maturities
of CDS swaps can be chosen independently from the maturity structure of debt
chosen by the firm. This means it is possible to have a full term structure
of credit spreads derived from the CDS prices even for names with few bonds
outstanding.
Lando (2004)[54] also compared the factors that influence the credit spread
between the CDS market and bond market, and explains the reason why CDS
spreads could be larger bond spreads. An important difference between default
swaps and bonds is the definition of a credit event. The ISDA (International
Swap and Derivatives Association) standard documentation for default swaps
includes restructuring as a credit event - even if no loss is caused to the bond
holders by the restructuring. The tendency for the CDS to have a wider defi-
nition of default than that of rating agencies would tend to increase the CDS
premium compared with the bond spread. A further argument could be that
the CDS buyer has no influence through covenants on the decisions made by the
issuer, in contrast with the owner of a reference bond. Additionally, the cost of
shorting a bond through a reverse repo also contributes to a larger CDS spread.
However, on the other hand, the desire of insurance companies and hedge funds
to sell CDS contracts as a means to obtain “unfunded” exposure to credit risk
could lower CDS spread, although little empirical evidence is available to date.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied the term structure of counterparty spread into details.
We first extend our model into credit crunch period and examine the default
risk of the same 55 reference entities used in previous chapter. We collect
their 5 year credit spreads from July 2007 - June 2009, combined with 5 year
Euro benchmark curve as risk-free rates, and 5 year EURIBOR Swap rates
as interest rate which considered to carry counterparty risk on top of riskless
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rate. Counterparty risk spread is approximated by taking the difference between
the two set of rates according to the same maturities. We then calibrate the
coefficients following the CIR process of intensity model and found a much higher
long-term mean of the intensity for those companies, with a higher volatility, and
relatively smaller mean-reversion speed. This indicates the intensity processes
are more dispersed with a high level of average comparing to the same set of
coefficients during July 2004 - June 2007.
We obtain a good proxy of counterparty risk, and by comparing our findings
with Mercurio (2009)[61], and validate our belief of the existence of counter-
party risk, and even further, show that our counterparty spread provides a
more consistent observation than that of Mercurio (2009)[61]. About 25 basis
points counterparty spread is found during peaceful market, which can soar up
to more than 100 basis points during stress period of the economy.
Chapter 8
The Term Structure of the
Counterparty Spread
Notation of Variables
fi log-normal distributed LIBOR forwards rates
µi drift component of the log-normal process
σi variance of the log-normal process
a, b, c, d parameters to determine ths shape of the instantaneous volatility
σi (t, Ti) the instantaneous volatility of the ith forward rate at time t.
Ti the expiry of the ith forward rate
t calendar time
τ time-to-maturity
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In this Chapter, we extend the counterparty credit spread from 5-year horizon
to a term structure from 1 year to 10 years. We first look into the term structure
of interest rates and credit default spread. We then look into the term structure
of counterparty credit risk and its dynamics during the credit crisis period and
found great similarity between the term structure of counterparty spread, and
the term structure of instantaneous volatility from Libor-Market-Model (LMM)
Rebonato first introduced in 2001. We then adapt the way Rebonato calibrates
parameters to describe the shape of instantaneous volatility under LMM model,
and calibrate the parameters to describe the shape of the counterparty spread,
using Markov Regima Switching.
8.1 The Term Structure of the Interest Rates
The term structure of interest rates refers to the relationship between bonds
of different terms, a yield curve is observed when interest rates of bonds are
plotted against their terms. The shape of the yield curve reflects the market’s
expectation of future interest rates and the conditions for monetary policy.
Usually longer term interest rates are higher than shorter term ones. This
is called a “normal yield curve” and is thought to reflect the higher inflation-
risk premium investor’s demand for longer term bonds. This is the yield curve
shape that forms during normal market conditions, wherein investors generally
believe that there will be no significant changes in the economy. During such
conditions, investors expect higher yields for fixed income instruments with
long-term maturities that occur further into the future.
The yield curve can become “steep” when the difference between long and
short term interest rates is large. This reflects a “loose” monetary policy which
means credit and money is readily available in an economy. This situation usu-
ally develops at an early stage of the economic cycle when a country’s monetary
authorities are trying to stimulate the economy after a recession or slowdown in
economic growth. The low short term interest rates reflect the easy availability
CHAPTER 8. THE TERM STRUCTUREOF THE COUNTERPARTY SPREAD126
of money and low or declining inflation. Higher longer term interest rates reflect
investor’s fear of future inflation.
When interest rates increase due to higher inflation expectations and tighter
monetary policy, a small or negligible difference between short and long term
interest rates occurs later in the economic cycle. This is called a “flat” yield curve
and higher short term rates reflect less available money, as monetary policy is
tightened and higher inflation later in the economic cycle.
This curve shape indicates that the market is sending mixed signals to in-
vestors, who are interpreting interest rate movements in various ways. During
such condition, it is difficult for the market to determine whether interest rates
will move significantly in either direction in the future. A flat yield curve usu-
ally occurs when the market is making a transition that emits different but
simultaneous indications of what interest rates will do. In rare cases wherein
longer-term interest rates decline, a flat curve can sometimes lead to an inverted
curve.
Conditions wherein the expectations of investors are completely the inverse
of a normal yield curve. In such abnormal market condition, bonds with longer
maturity are expected to offer lower yields than bonds with shorter maturity.
This indicates that the market currently expects interest rates to decline in the
future.
Tight monetary policy results in short term interest rates being higher than
longer term rates, which occurs as a shortage of money and credit drives up the
cost of short term capital. Longer term rates stay lower as investors expect an
eventual loosening of monetary policy and declining inflation. This increase the
demand for long term bonds which lock in the higher long term rates.
Financial academics and economists have developed theories to explain the
shape of yield curve. Mathematically, the yield curve can be used to predict
interest rates at future dates.
CHAPTER 8. THE TERM STRUCTUREOF THE COUNTERPARTY SPREAD127
8.2 The Term Structure of Credit Default Spread
Below is a figure sourced from Lando (1997)[52], which simulates term structure
of credit default spread for different ratings. It can be seen that for lower rating
firms, their credit spreads tend to increase over the years, as they are expected
to downgrade to lower class and contain higher default risk. Whereas for lower
rating class, the credit spread tend to decrease as in the next few year will be
crucial period for those firms. Once they have past that stage, they are expected
to have improved structure of assets and credibility.
The same concepts apply to the bond market, for investment grade bonds,
the probability of default in a year tends to be an increasing function of time,
this is because the bond issuer is initially considered to be creditworthy, the
more time that elapses, the greater the possibility that its financial health will
decline; on the other hand, for bonds with a poor credit rating, the probability
of default is often a decreasing function of time. This is because for bonds with a
poor credit rating, the next year or two can be crucial period for the underlying
firm, the longer it survives, the greater the chance that its financial health will
improve.
The schedule of credit spread of an issuer as a function of maturity is at-
tracting a lot of attention today with the development of the bond to credit
paradigm. Insurance instruments such as Credit Default Swaps are becoming
liquid for maturities up to five or ten years. In reduced form model, the term
structure of credit spreads is often captured by a default intensity parameter
which is assumed to be a function of time and spot.
As Henrotte (2003)[38] pointed out, tweaking the default intensity does the
job and yields simple numerical procedures, however, this is achieved at the cost
of hiding the stochastic structure of the default process. The term structure of
credit spread contains key information which is revealed in a time-homogeneous
framework with a few constant parameters. Henrotte calibrates the parameters
of a time-homogeneous regime-switching model, which reveals far more informa-
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Figure 8.1: The simulated term structure of spreads in basis points for credit
classes AAA, AA, A, and BBB
as a function of maturity. These spreads assume risk neutrality and zero recovery
rate. They are calculated based on the generator matrix from Lando (1997).
Figure 8.2: The simulated term structure of spreads in basis points for credit
classes BB, B, CCC as a function of maturity
These spreads assume risk neutrality and a zero recovery rate. They are based
on the generator matrix from Lando (1997)[52].
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tion on the underlying stochastic nature of the problem than using a seemingly
simpler model with fewer parameters which must be tweaked every period.
Take Volkswagen for example, we take snapshots of its credit spread to
represent the dynamic of its term structure, fig. 8.3 shows the term structure
patterns of Volkswagen from July 2007 until August 2009, which obtains the
major time period of credit crisis up-to-date. As one can observe, since July
2007, the credit crunch start to cause serious concern in the financial market,
with all the write-down of credit debt and failure of pricing for structured finance
products, financial institutions start to announce big losses in their loan and
structured finance sector. The credit spread for the underlying entities start to
shift parallel upwards to represent a higher probability of default. The shape
of their term structure does not change and stays upward sloping. This means
that the chances for the underlying to default in the long term are still higher
than that of the short term.
However, since September 2008, default events, nationalisation and acquisi-
tion of a few major banks took place around the globe, the market started to
crash even further. Investors start to panic and consider current situation could
not be worse. Therefore, as can be seen in the second graph of fig. 8.3, the
short end spread starts to pick up dramatically and out-win the longer spread.
Spreads from both the short end and long end of the term structure maintain
at peak level of their credit spread history. This phenomenon continues until
the end of 2008 and into 2009, where market starts to normalise and calm down
from what has happened in Sept 2008. The pattern of term structure starts to
shift downwards, however, maintain the decreasing shape. This indicates that
the confidence from the credit market remains low given what has happened.
This change of patterns for term structure of CDS spread with/without
counterparty risk applies to most of the 55 sample underlying names.
Notice the spreads in fig. 8.3 come directly from the CDS market, which
means counterparty risk was ignored. In order to account counterparty risk into
the picture, we take the term structure of spread difference between the Euro
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Figure 8.3: Terms structure patterns of Volkswagen spreads from July 2007 -
Aug 2009
Spreads are obtained directly from Datastream (without counterparty-risk ad-
justment), source: Datastream.
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Figure 8.4: Terms structure patterns of Volkswagen spreads from July 2007 -
Aug 2009
Spreads are obtained directly from Datastream, and adjusted to be
counterparty-risk free (by adding the counterparty spread on top of original
CDS spread), source: Datastream.
CHAPTER 8. THE TERM STRUCTUREOF THE COUNTERPARTY SPREAD132
swap rates and the Euro Benchmark rates as the representative for counterparty
risk spread, same as we did in previous chapter for 5 year maturity but extend
the horizon from 1 year to 10 years. We later add onto the term structure of
credit spread for individual underlying entities, to represent the “true” credit
risk of the underlying reference entities, as shown in fig. 8.4. As we could ob-
serve, the changes in term structure shape maintains similar progress, however,
shows smoother progress in terms of the difference of credit spread between the
short term and the long term. The spread level maintains at an even higher
level. This is because during the credit crisis, the market’s confidence on finan-
cial institutions as counterparty issuers has reached its lowest point in history.
Therefore the counterparty add-on is much greater than that in pre-crisis time
(as shown in fig. 7.2). The chance of default for underlying entities are higher
than that of those spreads observed directly from the CDS market. We will
study the shape of term structure for counterparty spread in more details in
latter section of this chapter.
8.2.1 The Swap Spread versus the Corporate-Bond Spread
Investment banks, which are the major dealers in the derivatives market and
key players as counterparties for all the deals, shares a special unique role in the
financial market. Majority of them are rates AA, or even AA, however, their
credit spread should not alter too much into the future like other AA firms.
Lando (2004)[54] also compared the difference between the government yield
curve, swap curve and AA rating spread curves. Although majority of the banks,
who are the issuers of interest rate swap, and credit default swap, have ratings
of AA or above, they are not expected to default in neither the short end nor
longer end of the spread curve. Therefore, the swap yield curve shows very
narrow spread with the AA rating spread at the short end; however, diverse
from the AA curve and shows a more parallel shape on top of government bond
at the long end, .
Lando (2004)[54] presents a simple model in which he obtains explicit solu-
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Figure 8.5: Government and AA par yield curves and swap curve for the model
in Source: Lando (2004)[54].
tions using affine models. He takes into account both the stochastic variation
in the six-month LIBOR rate and the possible deterioration of credit quality
through rating downgrades of a particular issuer. His model can be easily ex-
tended to include more factors to better capture slop effects of the term struc-
ture.
As shown in figure 8.5, Lando’s model produces exactly the kind of pattern
that has been observed empirically with swaps rates close to AA rates in the
short end and increasing spread between AA rates and the swap rate as maturity
grows.
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8.3 The Term Structure of the Counterparty Spread
Using the same approach as in Chapter 5 and 6 to approximate the counter-
party risk, we extend the counterparty proxy from 5-year spread only to a term
structure of 1 to 10 years. We take the difference between the spread of swap
curve and the European Benchmark curve as the counterparty spread, given
each tenor year within the term structure. Fig. 8.6 shows the historic term
structure of counterparty spread, by taking the difference between swap rates
from EURIBOR and risk-free rates from Euro Benchmark Curve, the figure
shows clearly how term structure of counterparty spread/risk over the years
including the credit crunch period.
Similar to instantaneous volatility from the LIBOR Market Model we will
introduce later, the counterparty spread shows a humped shape during “nor-
mal” time with the peak of term structure mostly at maturity of 3 years. From
January 2005 until March 2006, the counterparty spread level remains low be-
tween around 10 basis points to 25 basis points. The term structure flatten out
during pre-credit-crunch period from April 2006 to June 2007, which shows the
market is giving mixed signals of the future counterparty risk. However, the
level of counterparty risk remains the same as the “peaceful” period Investors
are holding their bonds/credit default spread of reference entities and waiting
for the direction market is going.
From July 2007- January 2009, credit crunch hit the market hard with two
major events period at July 2007 till March 2008, when many investment banks
announce huge losses and Bear Stearn’s default. This increases the counterparty
spread as investors is getting anxious about financial institutions as counterparty
of interest rate derivatives and credit risk derivatives. By September 2008, with
the failure to save Lehman Brothers, one of the top four investment banks, and
acquisition of Merill Lynch, together with many other bankruptcy, national-
isation and acquisition events happening then, the market starts to collapse.
Investors lose faith of the financial institutions as counterparty and write-down
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Figure 8.6: Historic Term Structure of Counterparty Credit Spread
by taking the difference between EURIBOR Swap Rates and Euro Benchmark
Curve from January 2005 to October 2009.
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of mortgaged back security market continues, the counterparty spread sour to
as high as 100 basis points with the short end of the term structure reaching
almost 200 basis points. The term structure of counterparty spread shows a
monotonically decreasing shape.
Things start to pick up in 2009, with the counterparty spread decrease within
100 basis points level, by keeping the same decreasing shape of “excited” period.
This shows although the conditions have improved, financial institutions are
still cautious about lending money to each other, or issuing interest rates swaps
and credit default swaps to each other as counterparties. By September 2009,
the counterparty spread is getting closer to its level before the credit crunch,
spanning 20 to 60 basis points, after the market has had a major shuﬄe in 2008,
with all the “damage” has been done.
This state of affairs would therefore give rise during “normal” period to a
maximum in the market uncertainty in the intermediate-maturity region. How-
ever, during “excited” periods of market turmoil, there is a lack of consensus
aParameter bout the short-term actions of the monetary authorities, the spread
at the short end can become very high. In this case, the counterparty credit
spread should sharply increase at the short end, and the hump would disappear.
A financial justification for the empirically-observed existence of a hump can
be explained as follows: at the short end of the maturity of counterparty spread
are influenced by the actions of the monetary authorities, which tend to signal
their intentions well ahead of their rate decisions. Surprises at the very short
end are therefore rare and in “normal” period, the uncertainty in the front Credit
Default Spread contracts tends to decline as they approach expiry. At the other
end of the maturity spectrum the variation of market expectations about very
distant spread rates is mainly driven by changing expectations about long-term
inflation. Again, the presumed future actions of central banks, which often
operate with an inflation target, would act to reduce the long-term volatility of
nominal rates (at least if one assumes that real rates are little volatile). The
greatest uncertainty resides in the intermediate region as tightening or loosening
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regime can easily be reversed or continued beyond what is originally anticipated.
8.4 Instantaneous Volatility Functional Form for
LMM
As mentioned in earlier sections, we found great similarity between the shape
for the term structure of counterparty spread and that of the instantaneous
volatilities of Libor Market Model. This section gives an introduction of the
Libor Market Model and the function that is used to describe the shape of the
term structure, under the framework of Markov Regime Switching.
It is well know that in the Black model for caplet, a closed form formula for
the price of caplet was derived assuming that the forward rates are log-normal
distributed and have constant volatility. The volatility implied by Black model
of a caplet is the volatility with which the Black formula returns the market
quoted price of the caplet. The LMM is constructed in a way that the LIBOR
forwards rates are log-normally distributed under the associated measure where
the Black formula applies. Once these functions are assigned, not only will the
stochastic innovation be fully specified, but also the deterministic (no-arbitrage)
drift component is defined.
dfi
fi
= µi ({σj} , {fj}) dt+ σi (t, Ti) dzi.
Prescribing desirable instantaneous volatility functions is therefore the pric-
ing problem in all the HJM-inspired pricing models (LIBOR Market Model, or
the swap-rate Market Model). A functional form is used to represent the instan-
taneous volatility which should lead to a reduction of number of parameters and
ultimately to a more stable calibration procedure. The parametrisation of the
volatility term structure proposed in Rebonato (1999) is tested most extensively
in the literature:
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Figure 8.7: Example of each parameter’s impact on the term structure shape
with initial values of a=-0.08, b=0.06, c=0.40 and d=0.15.
σi (t, Ti) = σi (τ) = [a+ bτi] exp (−cτi) + d, (8.1)
τi = Ti − t, (8.2)
where Ti is the expiry of the ith forward rate, t is calendar time and σi (t, Ti)is
the instantaneous volatility of the ith forward rate at time t.
The functional form in eq. (8.1) has become the starting point for a popular
stochastic-volatility extension of the LIBOR market model, some or all of the pa-
rameters (or their logarithms) are given a mean-reverting (Ornstein-Uhlenbeck)
process.
As we can see in fig. 8.7 the change of shape due to the change of different
parameters within equation (8.1). The value of a determines the spread at very
short end, whereas it has no impact in the longer maturity. It determines the
shape of spread term structure from humped shape to monotonically decreasing;
value of b determines the volume of the peak at the hump; c determines the
CHAPTER 8. THE TERM STRUCTUREOF THE COUNTERPARTY SPREAD139
time when peak happens, whereas d shifts the spread term structure parallel
onto different levels.
The functional form of eq. (8.1) has the advantage of being simple yet afford-
ing a transparent interpretation for the parameters and their combinations. As
time to maturity τ goes to zero, instantaneous and average volatility coincide:
σTt = a+ d = lim
T→0
σˆ (t) , (8.3)
With c positive, the volatility tends to d for large time-to-maturity τ , and
is equal to a + d at τ = 0 which corresponds to option expiry. When b, c > 0
there is a maximum value at
τ˜ = 1/c− a/b. (8.4)
8.4.1 Markov Regime Switching
Markov Regime Switching can be applied in different sectors and aspects in
Finance and Economics to model a variety of different phenomena, including
asset prices and market crashes. The first financial model to use a Markov chain
was the regime-switching model of James D. Hamilton in 1989, where a Markov
chain is employed to model switches between periods of high volatility and low
volatility of asset returns. A more recent example is the Markov Switching
Multifactor asset pricing model, which builds upon the convenience of earlier
regime-switching models. It uses an arbitrarily large Markov chain to drive the
level of volatility of asset returns. Markov chains are heavily used in dynamic
macroeconomics, an example is to use Markov chains to exogenous model prices
of equity in a general equilibrium setting.
Bollen, Gray, and Whaley (2000)[5] examine the ability of regime-switching
models to capture the dynamics of foreign exchange rates. They test the ability
of the models to fit foreign exchange rate data in-sample and forecast variance
out-of-sample. They find that a regime-switching model with independent shifts
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in mean and variance exhibits a closer fit and more accurate variance forecasts
than a range of other models. They then use exchange-traded currency options
to determine whether market prices reflect regime-switching information and
find that observed option prices are significantly different from their theoretical
levels determined by a regime-switching option valuation model and that a sim-
ulated trading strategy based on regime-switching option valuation generates
higher profits than standard single-regime alternatives. Overall, their results
indicate that regime-switching models may have practical implications for in-
vestors and captures the dynamics of exchange rates better than alternative
time series models.
In credit risk, Das et al. (2006)[16] provide a comprehensive empirical in-
vestigation of how default probabilities co-vary using a database of issuer level
default probabilities for the period 1987-2000. The database they select pro-
vides a unique opportunity to understand how default risk behaves both in the
cross-section of firms and in the time series of all public non-financial firms in
the U.S.. In order to account for their observation that default probabilities and
correlation vary with economic events, they allow the economy-wide default risk
to be regime-dependent. Strong support are found for a two-regime model, with
a high default regime and a low default regime, the high default regime has a
mean default level more than twice as high as the low default regime. They also
demonstrate that each regime shows a different correlation structure, wherein
default correlations are higher in the high default regime compared with those
in the low default regime. Therefore, systematic variation in joint default risk
may be modelled within a simple reduced-form framework, which allows default
risk to be quantified at a portfolio level.
Jarrow et al. (1997)[44] presents a simple Markov model for valuing risky
debt that explicitly incorporates a firm’s credit rating as an indicator of the
likelihood of default. They provide an arbitrage-free model for the term struc-
ture of credit risk spreads and their evolution through time. The model is based
on Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)[47], with the bankruptcy process following a
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discrete state space, continuous time, time-homogeneous Markov chain in credit
ratings. This model is useful for pricing and hedging corporate debt with em-
bedded options, for pricing and hedging: OTC derivatives with counterparty
risk; or foreign government bonds subject to default risk; or credit derivatives;
and for risk management in general.
Joshi & Rebonato (2001)[49] present an extension of the LIBOR market
model, which allows the stochastic instantaneous volatility of the forward rates
in a displace diffusion setting. They successfully extend the deterministic volatil-
ity case to the stochastic volatility case while keeping all the powerful and im-
portant approximations. They also show that the market caplet surface across
strikes and maturities can be well recovered even after reducing the number of
the structure of volatility.
Rebonato & Kainth (2003) introduce a two-regime, Markov chain extension
to the LMM model, where the unobservable instantaneous-volatility process mi-
grates between two states, one of which is associated with the parameters that
give a monotonically-decreasing term structure of the instantaneous volatility,
and the other with the parameters associate with a humped shape. Rebon-
ato (2006)[65] suggests that a two-regime Markov chain approach may be more
successful and better financially motivated, more generally, his study highlights
the shortcomings of purely time-dependent or time-homogeneous approaches.
He concludes that neither time-homogeneity nor time dependence constitute
a desirable modelling approach, and that the possibility of the instantaneous
volatility migrating between a normal to an excited state is likely to be a nec-
essary ingredient for a convincing description of the dynamics of the swaption
surface.
8.5 Counterparty Credit Spread under the Markov
Regime Switching
The framework for the two-regime, Markov chain approach is as follows:
CHAPTER 8. THE TERM STRUCTUREOF THE COUNTERPARTY SPREAD142
CSi (t, Ti) = ytCS
n
i (t, Ti) + (1− yt)CSxi (t, Ti) ,
CSni (t, Ti) = [a
n
t + b
n
t (T − t)] exp (−cnt (T − t)) + dnt ,
CSxi (t, Ti) = [a
x
t + b
x
t (T − t)] exp (−cxt (T − t)) + dxt . (8.5)
The two different sets of coefficients {an, bn, cn, dn} and {ax, bx, cx, dx} are
associated with the normal (superscript n) and excited state (superscript x)
and the latent variable, y, takes value 0 or 1 following a two-state Markov-chain
process between the normal state and excited state, with transition probabilities:
P =
 Pnn Pnx
Pxn Pxx
 =
 Pnn 1− Pnn
1− Pxx Pxx
 . (8.6)
where Pxn is the probability of going from the excited to the normal state.
The unconditional probabilities of being in the normal and excited state are:
qn =
1− Pxx
2− Pnn − Pxx and qx =
1− Pnn
2− Pnn − Pxx . (8.7)
The interpretation of the two states as “normal” and “excited” has an intu-
itively motivation to the procedure. It fits well with the empirical observation of
sharp transitions in the swaption implied-volatility matrix between well-defined
states. Our intuition is that the system should spend most of its time in a
normal state, and experience short transitions to the excited state.
8.5.1 Parameter Constraints
The parameters that need to fit are:
an, bn, cn, and dn describing the normal volatility curve;
ax, bx, cx, and dx describing the excited volatility curve;
Pnn and Pxx describing the Markov transition matrix.
Here we make the counterparty spread non-deterministic via the following
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stochastic mean-reverting behaviour for the coefficients {an, bn, cn, dn} or their
logarithm under “normal” state, and {ax, bx, cx, dx} or their logarithm under
“excited” state, respectively as appropriate:
dat = βa (θa − at) dt+ σa (t) dzat (8.8)
dbt = βb (θb − bt) dt+ σb (t) dzbt (8.9)
d ln ct = βc (θc − ln ct) dt+ σc (t) dzct (8.10)
d ln dt = βd (θd − ln dt) dt+ σd (t) dzdt (8.11)
All the Brownian increments within the formula above are uncorrelated with
each other and θ denotes the long-term mean of those coefficients individually
under either “normal” or “excited” routine, and β denotes the mean reversion
speed for those coefficient under each state.
P =
 Pnn Pnx
Pxn Pxx
 =
 Pnn 1− Pnn
1− Pxx Pxx
 . (8.12)
8.6 Results
Given the framework of credit spread determined by a different set of coefficient:
{an, bn, cn, dn} under “normal” state, and {ax, bx, cx, dx} under “excited” state,
we calibrate the coefficient by shape and level of term structure of counterparty
spread for each observation date. However, what we do different from Rebonato
& Kainth (2003) is to determine the “normal” or “excited” state purely upon
the counterparty spread level, rather than the shape of the term structure. It is
clear to us, although some rare dates during the credit crisis the term structure
of counterparty spread shows a hockey-stick humped shape, that does not indi-
cate that the market is back to a normal state, the belief in the counterparty
credibility for those dates is still weak, hence we have to define them as “ex-
cited” state. We define the 1 year counterparty as the most sensitive point to
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Normal Regime Excited Regime
an bn ln cn ln dn ax bx ln cx ln dx
θ -1.237 -3.533 1.141 -1.763 -1.005 1.756 -0.261 -0.889
β 0.109 0.204 0.421 0.220 0.146 0.217 0.145 0.481
σ 3.523 8.808 1.615 0.892 4.269 4.998 0.598 0.271
Table 8.1: Calibrated parameters to describe counterparty spread term structure
under “normal” and “excited” regime, where for each regime, θ represents long-
term mean, β represents mean-reversion speed, and σ represents volatility.
respond to current market situation and the is a major coefficient to determine
the shape of the term structure of counterparty spread. If it has risen above
50 basis point, then the counterparties are in an “excited” state, the rest are all
defined as “normal” state.
Once the dates are categorised as “normal” or “excited” by our criteria, and
individual daily coefficients of {a, b, c, d} are calibrated, we separate the coeffi-
cients individually by the state it occurs, and further calibrate their long-term
mean and mean-reversion speed as well as volatility. Take coefficient a for ex-
ample, which determines the level of counterparty spread in the long end of
the term structure. We first gather all the values of an under normal state,
and calibrate its long term mean and mean-reversion speed as well as volatility,
we do the same for the rest of the parameters for bn, cn and dn and repeat our
calibration for {ax, bx, cx, dx}. Notice that for coefficients c and d, logarithmic
values are taken to guarantee strictly positive value for those coefficients.
By separating our observations from 2004 - 2009 into “normal” or “excited”
states, we obtain two sets of values for the mean-reverting process {an, bn, cn, dn}
and {ax, bx, cx, dx} , or their logarithm under each state, bearing their impact
on the shape of counterparty term-structure.
8.6.1 Transition Matrix
When it comes to transition matrix calibration, P =
 Pnn Pnx
Pxn Pxx
 can choose
different values to converge to a same set of eigenvalues to represent the uncon-
ditional probability of the two regimes. Although we have chosen a time span
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of 5 years of data, it is still worth to expand the time horizon further to look at
historical probability for excited events to happen.
In here, we assume the transition matrix takes the value of P =
 Pnn Pnx
Pxn Pxx
 =
 0.894 0.106
0.599 0.400
. Then we obtain the unconditional of “normal” regime’s prob-
ability to be 0.85, and the unconditional of “excited” regime to be (1− 0.85) =
0.15. Different possible values of matrix P can be assigned to represent one’s
belief of market behaviour.
8.7 Conclusion
This chapter looks at the shape of term structure of credit spread with/without
counterparty risk. We mainly focus on the term structure of counterparty spread
and compare its similarity towards the shape of term structure of instantaneous
volatility of the LIBOR Market Model Rebonato first introduced in 2001, it is
later improved by making a two-regime Markov model, and even making the
coefficients of each state to be stochastic and calibrate parameters for each coef-
ficients. We find the two-regime switching concept is necessary for counterparty
spread calibration, as the term structure of counterparty spread and its level
does change during the credit crunch and it is very distinct from that of a
peaceful time.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this Chapter we describe a few suggestions for further research and conclude
by summarising the contributions made in this thesis.
9.1 Suggestion for Future Research
There are several factors this thesis does not take into account:
9.1.1 Central Clearing House
A central clearing house for the CDS market is called for by the regulators to
eliminate the counterparty risk, it is demanded both in the academic world and
among practitioners. However, the example of mortgage agencies such as Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, to provide a non-default guarantee as a mediator, is a
good example that a central clearing house is not a solution for all 1, cautions
are still required when booking the CDS contract correctly and monitor the
underlying entity’s default risk sensibly.
1Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were being placed into conservator-ship of the FHFA.
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9.1.2 Netting and Collateralisation
This thesis ignores the effect from netting agreement and collateralisation. Net-
ting and collateralisation with frequent margin adjustments are essential for
counterparties that are involved in various derivatives and security financing
trades (SFT). This is because even in the absence of reference entity default, a
failure of a major counterparty could lead to losses across the financial system.
Upon the default of the counterparty, OTC derivatives would be immediately
and significantly re-priced, with credit spreads likely widening dramatically. It
is standard practice for financial institutions to enter derivative contracts doc-
umented on Master Agreements as recommended by the ISDA (international
Swaps and Derivative Association). All ISDA contract holders are ranked pari
passu to senior debt, in terms of claims on a defaulting counterparty. Margin
agreements require banks to post different levels of collateral on their outstand-
ing contracts depending on the current mark-to-market of the contract. Another
advantage of trading within the ISDA framework is the provision of netting.
Netting agreements come into action in the case of actual counterparty default.
Without such agreements, a surviving counterparty would legally have to fully
meet its obligations to the defaulting counterparty, while only being left with a
claim on its dues from the same.
The counterparty risk after collateralisation and establishment of netting
agreement with other derivatives traded with the same counterparty can be
further investigated. However, the counterparty effect after collateralisation,
and netting after counterparty default is difficult to quantify, that is why this
paper ignores this effect and leave space for further study.
9.1.3 Other Non-default Components
In Chapter 5 and 6, when comparing the default components derived from both
the bond market and the CDS market, we assume the difference between the
intensities from the two markets purely comes from the liquidity risk, a non-
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default component. Further investigation can be done to find other determinants
of the non-default components on this difference from both a cross-sectional and
time-series perspective using a number of explanatory variables such as tax and
liquidity-related bid-ask spread.
9.1.4 Stochastic Intensity
For the contagion model in Chapter 4, instead of making the default intensity
time-variant, a possible alternative could be to make the default intensity a
stochastic process. However, the mathematical solution might be difficult to
find, where a Monte-Carlo simulation might need to be employed.
9.2 Concluding Remark
In this thesis we focus on the counterparty risk aspect of credit default swap
pricing. In Chapter 3 and 4, we firstly carry out a theoretical analysis based
on the contagion model introduced by Jarrow & Yu (2001)[48], and extend the
framework from discrete premium rate into continuous premium rate, by ap-
plying the change of numeraire technique. We further extend it into three-firm
model, where protection buyer is defaultable. Chapter 5 carries out an empirical
work to find counterparty risk for credit default swaps. We introduce a coun-
terparty risk proxy by taking the difference between 5-year credit spread over
swap rate, and 5-year credit spread over benchmark rate, we then obtain the
counterparty-risk-free spread after this treatment and apply the Cox-Ingersoll-
Ross framework to model the credit spread dynamic of 55 sample underlying en-
tities. Chapter 6 investigates the counterparty risk during credit crunch period
using the same CIR model. Chapter 7 studies the shape of the term structure
of the counterparty credit spread by adopting the function Rebonato (2006)[65]
uses to approximate the shape of the term structure of instantaneous volatility
under Libor-Market-Model, where additional Markov Regime Switching is ap-
plied in order to represent the “normal” and “excited” condition before, during
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and after the sub-prime crisis..
9.2.1 Contagion Default Model
Theoretical work is firstly done to demonstrate the impact of joint default events
between reference entity, protection seller and protection buyer on the CDS
spread. A contagion model is applied, it assumes a discrete constant default in-
tensity under the reduced-form framework, which is introduced by Jarrow & Yu
(2001)[48]. In Chapter 3, we extend the previous study by making the premium
payment a continuous process, a closed form solution is then provided based on
the change of measure technique introduced in Collins-Dufresne et al. (2002)[11]
in the valuation procedure of the swap rate. Using the change of measure solves
the problem of violation of jump conditions under Cox processes for defaultable
credit derivatives, instead of assuming a primary-secondary framework to over-
come the integrations. More indicative and simple results of the swap premium
calculation is found by extending to a continuous-time premium rate instead of
its discrete counterpart. The results validate the assumption that higher the
default intensity of protection seller, lower the swap premium, and vice versa.
On the other hand, by fixing the intensity rate constant, the longer the settle-
ment period, the more likely the counterparty will default within the period,
and the less a protection buyer would pay for protection against the default of
the reference entity.
Carrying on with the contagion framework, Chapter 4 extends the coun-
terparty risk model to a three-firm model. This makes the protection buyer
defaultable with the rest of the parties. However, the results show that protec-
tion seller’s default probability does not play an as important role as protection
seller and reference entity, similar results is derived as the two-firm model. Set-
tlement period and counterparty B’s total intensity rate still play a crucial role
in the swap premium calculation, which is in sync with the two-firm model.
In order to make our findings more generic, we relax some of the assumptions
and make the intensity rates time-variant by simulating an economy upturn and
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downturn every decade. In a two-firm defaultable environment, the premium
rate does not vary much from the constant intensity rate case, in fact if settle-
ment period is relatively small, the time-variant intensity case generates close
results to the constant intensity example.
9.2.2 CIR Model for CDS spread
In Chapter 5 and 6, a counterparty spread proxy is done by taking the difference
between spread over government bond and spread over swap yield. Counterparty
spread is then added onto the CDS spread from the CDS or bond market to
represent the real default spread of the corporate bond issuer. In doing so one
can retain true credit spread of a firm who does not have sufficient information
from the bond market by adding the counterparty spread on top of credit spread
from the CDS market. 5-year credit spread is extracted from the bond market
by using the bracketing technique, which is to calculate the credit spread of all
the bonds of a company of different maturities and regress the credit spread of
5-year maturity.
Once the counterparty-risk-free credit spread is obtained, we calibrate the
dynamic process of default intensity using the CIR model used for short-term
interest rates. We found that the mean-reversion speed is similar across all the
55 sample companies, we also found that using the government bond provides a
good estimate for risk-free rate. Comparing the default intensity between CDS
market and the default intensity from bond market, we found that the spread
from CDS market provides better liquidity and responds more sensitively to
market signals.
In Chapter 6 we study the term structure of counterparty spread into details.
We extend our model into credit crunch period and examine the default risk of
the same 55 reference entities used in Chapter 5. Counterparty risk spread is
approximated by taking the difference between the swap rates and government
bond rates according to the same maturities. The default intensity process is
then calibrated to follow the CIR process. A much higher long-term mean of
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the intensity is found for the sample companies, with a higher volatility, and
relatively smaller mean-reversion speed. This indicates the intensity process
are more dispersed with a high level of average comparing to the same set of
coefficients during July 2004 - June 2007.
We compare our proxy for counterparty risk with the one proposed in Mer-
curio (2009)[61], we validate our belief of the existence of counterparty risk, and
show that our counterparty spread provides a more consistent observation than
that of Mercurio (2009)[61]. About 25 basis points counterparty spread is found
in our study during peaceful “normal” market, however, it can soar up to more
than 100 basis points during stress period of the economy.
Chapter 7 looks at the shape of the term structure of credit spread with/without
counterparty risk. We focus on the term structure of counterparty spread and
compare its similarity towards the shape of term structure of instantaneous
volatility of the LIBOR Market Model Rebonato first introduced in 2001. We
improve it by making a two-regime Markov model, and even more, we make
the coefficients of each state to be stochastic when calibrating parameters for
each coefficients. The two-regime switching concept is found to be necessary for
counterparty spread calibration, as the term structure of counterparty spread
and its level changes dramatically during credit crunch period, which is very
distinct from that of a peaceful time.
Appendix A
Markov Chains
In Mathematics, a Markov Chain, named after Andrey Markov, is a random
process where all information about the future is contained in the present state
(i.e. one does not need to examine the past to determine the future). If a
process has the Markov property, its future states only depend on the present
state, and are independent of its past states. In other words, the observation
of the present state fully captures all the information that could influence the
future evolution of the process. Making this a stochastic process means that all
the states transitions are probabilistic.
At each step the system may change its state from the current state to
another state, if not remain in the same state, according to a probability distri-
bution. The change of state is called a transition, and the probabilities linked
with transitions are called transition probabilities.
A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables X1, X2, X3, . . . with the
Markov property, which means given the present state, the future and past
states are independent:
Pr (Xn+1 = x | X1 = x1, X2 = x2, · · · , Xn = xn) = Pr (Xn+1 = x | Xn = xn) .
(A.1)
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The possible values of Xi form the state space of the chain, namely, set
S. Continuous-time Markov processes have a continuous index, and time-
homogeneous Markov chains are processes such as
Pr (Xn+1 = x | Xn = y) = Pr (Xn = x | Xn−1 = y) . (A.2)
for all n. Which means the probability of transition is independent of n.
The probability of going from state i to state j in n time steps is
p
(n)
ij = Pr (Xn = j | X0 = i) , (A.3)
and the single-step transition is
pij = Pr (X1 = j | X0 = i) , (A.4)
For a time-homogeneous Markov chain:
p
(n)
ij = Pr (Xn+k = j | Xk = i) , (A.5)
and
pij = Pr (Xk+1 = j | Xk = i) . (A.6)
Therefore the n-step transition satisfies the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation,
that for any k such that 0 < k < n,
p
(n)
ij =
∑
r∈S
p
(k)
ri p
(n−k)
rj ,
where S is the state space of the Markov chain. The marginal distribution
Pr (Xn = x) is the distribution over states at time n. the initial distribution is
Pr (X0 = x). The evolution of the process through one time step is described
by
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Pr (Xn = j) =
∑
r∈S
prjPr (Xn−1 = r) =
∑
r∈S
p
(n)
rj Pr (X0 = r) .
Where the superscript (n) is an index instead of an exponent.
A.1 Example of Markov Regime Switching
Here, two regimes are chosen, and they are called “normal” and “excited” states.
Given the economic state on the preceding day, the transition probabilities be-
tween states can be represented by a transition matrix:
P =
 Pnn Pnx
Pxn Pxx
 =
 Pnn 1− Pnn
1− Pxx Pxx
 =
 0.9 0.1
0.6 0.4

The matrix P represents the weather model in which a normal market con-
dition is 90% likely to be followed by another normal day, whereas a excited day
is 40% likely to be followed by another excited day. Pij is the probability that
given a day is of type i, it will be followed by a day of type j. Notice that the
rows of P sum to 1, which is because P is a stochastic matrix.
Predicting the market condition: the market condition at day 0 is known to
be normal, this is represented by a vector in which the “normal” entry is 1, and
the “excited” entry is 01.
x(0) =
[
1 0
]
, (A.7)
the weather on day 1 can be predicted as:
x(1) = x(0)P =
[
1 0
] 0.9 0.1
0.6 0.4
 = [ 0.9 0.1 ] . (A.8)
Thus, there is a 90% chance that the next day, day 1, will also be “normal”.
1The market condition can also be set as “normal” entry is 0, and the “excited” entry is 1,
however, this is only a initial setup and does not affect long term probability of “normal” or
“excited” once we have reached the steady state distribution.
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The market condition on day 2 can be predicted in the same way:
x(2) = x(1)P = x(0)P 2 =
[
1 0
] 0.9 0.1
0.6 0.4

2
=
[
0.87 0.13
]
. (A.9)
To make it more general: x(n) = x(n−1)P = x(0)Pn.
Steady state of the market condition
In this example, predictions for the market condition on more distant days
are becoming inaccurate increasingly and tend towards a steady state vector.
This vector represents the probabilities of “normal” and “excited” stage on all
days, and is independent of the initial market condition.
The steady state vector is defined as:
q = lim
n→∞x
(n) (A.10)
But only converges to a strictly positive vector if P is a regular transition
matrix, which means there is at least one Pn with all non-zero entries. Since q
is independent from initial conditions, it must be unchanged when transformed
by P . This makes it an eigenvector (with eigenvalue 1), which means it can be
derived from P . For the market condition example:
P =
 0.9 0.1
0.6 0.4

qP = q = qI
q (P − I) = 0
q

 0.9 0.1
0.6 0.4
−
 1 0
0 1

 = q

 −0.1 0.1
0.6 −0.6


[
q1 q2
] −0.1 0.1
0.6 −0.6
 = [ 0 0 ]
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Which means −0.1q1 + 0.6q2 = 0 and since they are probability vector we
know that q1 + q2 = 1.
Solving this pair of simultaneous equations gives us the steady state distri-
bution:
[
q1 q2
]
=
[
0.857 0.143
]
In conclusion, in the long term, 86% of the days are “normal” market status,
whereas the rest 14% are “excited” market.
A.2 Real-World probability vs. Risk-Neutral Prob-
abilities
The default probabilities implied from bond yields are risk-neutral probabilities
of default. This can be shown from the calculations which assume expected
default losses can be discounted at the risk-free rate. This risk-neutral valuation
principle shows that this is a valid procedure providing the expected loss to be
calculated in a risk-neutral world. On the other hand, the default probabilities
implied from historical data are real-world default probabilities.
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